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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study is to examine the supposed ties between the samurai
warrior of Japan and the Zen school of Buddhism. It has been suggested by numerous
authors that Zen served as the foundation of warrior training methods and ethical codes.
This study suggests that the relationship between warrior and Zen has been overstated,
and the image of the Zen warrior was largely a product of intense nationalism that
dominated Japanese political and religious institutions during the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries.
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Introduction
This thesis will address what I believe to be an all too common fallacy. It is
the idea that Zen was, from its beginnings as an independent school of Buddhism, the
foundation of a samurai warrior's lifestyle. This fallacy has captured the imagination
of scholars, authors, filmmakers, and martial artists. Specifically, this paper will
examine the relationship or, more appropriately, the lack of a significant relationship
between the samurai warrior of Japan and Zen Buddhism. Many have argued that
Zen was the religion of choice for the warrior class, that it provided the fighting man
with the mental clarity necessary to execute his duties with the kind of skill and
precision that only a Zen adherent could possess, or that the tendency of Zen masters
to deemphasize mental constructions of right and wrong, good and evil, was
particularly appealing to those who may have to kill other human beings on the field
of battle. From a purely a priori standpoint, one might assume that such arguments
are warranted, that they reflect common concerns of the warrior lifestyle. Indeed,
samurai were often faced with the unfortunate duty of killing other human beings and
as career soldiers were certainly eager to sharpen their fighting skills. However,
those who are content to rely upon this style of reasoning take little account of the
historical development of the samurai as a distinctive class of citizens, as well as of
the complexities of Zen Buddhism. Moreover, the impetus for many of these
arguments was fueled by nationalistic or ethnocentric agendas of writers of the late
nineteenth and early twentieth century, as opposed to a genuine desire for historical
accuracy or an effort to maintain objectivity. Those who base their opinions upon
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these problematic arguments effectively advance the propagation of misinformation,
leading to the creation of a corpus of literature that purports an intimate connection
between samurai and Zen.
The works alluded to above come primarily from Japanese authors of the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries such as Kaiten Nukariya, D.T. Suzuki, and
Inazo Nitobe. These individuals are but a few of a vast number of writers who
popularized the image of the samurai warrior as a strict Zen adherent. As we shall
see, much of their interpretation was inspired by nationalistic attitudes that typified
much of Japanese literature during this time period. More importantly, we will see
the ways in which the works of these authors have influenced others in their
investigation of samurai religiosity. Winston King, Richard Storry, and Heinrich
Dumoulin are some examples of authors who have carried on the fallacy of "samurai
Zen." Moreover, the rise in popularity of martial arts in the Americas and elsewhere
has prompted some, such as the American martial arts instructor Scott Shaw, to
accept and propagate the romantic images produced by those listed above, leading to
an even wider acceptance of the idea that samurai were strict adherents of Zen
Buddhism.
The era following the collapse of the Tokugawa shogunate occupies a central
place in our investigation. It was during this time period that the Japanese
government began building a modem military in hopes of preventing colonial powers
from taking control of Japan. At the same time, the Japanese government began to
look for ways to extend their influence onto the Asian mainland. As Japan's power
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and international prestige grew, nationalistic sentiments 1 became a pervasive aspect
of the Japanese political and social arenas. As is common in other nations who have
experienced a growth in nationalism, religious institutions became involved in the
propagation of nationalistic rhetoric. As a consequence, many began to reinterpret
the history and function of their religious tradition so as to remain in step with
growing nationalistic sentiments.
In regard to the Zen school, as with other schools of Buddhism, the process of
aligning itself with the growing trend of nationalism was exacerbated by the fact that
the early Meiji government made a concentrated effort to suppress Buddhism, which
was viewed as a foreign religion, and to replace it with a state-sanctioned form of
Shinto. Government officials closed temples, returned monks and nuns to lay life,
and attempted to remove Buddhist images from Shinto shrines. Although their efforts
failed, Buddhists must have felt it necessary to prove their usefulness to the "new"
Japan, as they began to present their religion as one that was in full support of the
Japanese war machine and Japanese nationalism.
Following the Meiji restoration in 1868 and well into the twentieth century,
the samurai emerged as a model of military excellence. The samurai, or, more
appropriately, the romanticized vision of the samurai, were associated with undying

1

It is difficult to determine when Japanese citizens began to imagine themselves as
part of a nation. While early Japanese government officials issued decrees that
addressed issues of "national" concern, local allegiances seem to have been
paramount. Nevertheless, one may say with relative certainty that the process of
nationbuilding began in earnest following unification in the Tokugawa era. In the
years following the Meiji restoration, most citizens recognized the concept of the
Japanese nation.
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loyalty, upstanding behavior, and, of course, skillful fighting. Indeed, romanticism
regarding the legendary fighting men of Medieval Japan was ubiquitous.2 As
politicians and propagandists began to recognize the usefulness of samurai imagery
in their quest to advance nationalism, Zen adherents began to follow suit. It is no
coincidence that Zen practitioners began to imagine their religious doctrine as the
foundation of warrior ethics and training methods at the same time that government
officials began to use images of the samurai as propaganda. Suddenly, there was a
vast corpus of literature that purported intimate ties between samurai and Zen, ties
that supposedly dated back to the Kamakura period. Individuals like D.T. Suzuki,
who claimed that "Zen was intimately related from the beginning of its history to the
life of the samurai", considered the shogun's patronage of Zen temples during the
early medieval age to be an indication of the samurai's deep affection for Zen. Also,
Zen adherents began to emphasize the importance of bushido (the way of the warrior)
as the moral foundation for Japan's modem military servicemen. Bushido is, in
essence, a code of chivalry for samurai warriors. However, bushido was also used as
a propaganda tool, as it was considered to embody the fighting spirit of the legendary
samurai, and it could be used by modem military servicemen to make them more
proficient fighters. Figures such as Shaku Soen, a Zen monk and D.T. Suzuki's Zen
master, claimed that the reason bushido had flourished since the Kamakura period

For example, a famous piece of Japanese World War Two propaganda depicts a
giant warrior clad in traditional medieval armor destroying British and American
ships with his oversized sword.
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was because of the influence of Zen.3 Kaiten Nukariya called bushido "the religion
of Japan", although he identifies Zen as a crucial element in its development.4 Thus,
Zen adherents began to integrate nationalistic rhetoric into their tradition.
Prior to the end of the Second World War, there was almost no Westem
scholarship on Japan or Japanese religious traditions. This is due in large part to the
fact that Japan remained relatively closed off from other countries, only permitting
certain nations to trade in Japanese ports. Also, very few Westemers were allowed to
live in or study Japan, as many Japanese citizens were wary of foreigners. The
authors discussed above, particularly D. T. Suzuki were instrumental in the spread of
Zen and the Zen/samurai fallacy, as their works were translated into English, and
some were even written with English speaking readers in mind. Thus, their vision of
the Zen tradition dominated the discourse on Zen Buddhism for decades. Indeed, as
Duncan Williams has noted, "Until the 1980s, scholars of Japanese Zen Buddhism in
the West almost always focused on three major approaches to Zen. Zen as taken as a
form of mysticism, as an Eastern philosophy, or as a part of Japanese culture."5 This
view of Japanese Zen Buddhism came primarily from sources such as those described
above. In the past twenty-five years, however, a new wave of scholarship has
emerged that have begun to examine Zen in a more precise manner. For Zen during
the Medieval period, William Bodiford's Soto Zen in Medieval Japan, Martin

3

See Brian Victoria, Zen at War (New York: Weatherhill, 1997). 99.
Kaiten Nukariya, The Religion of the Samurai (New Jersey: Rowman & Littlefield,
1973).
5
Duncan Ryiiken Williams, The Other Side of Zen: A Social History ofSoto Zen
Buddhism in Tokugawa Japan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005). 1.
4

6
Colcutts's Five Mountains: The Rinzai Zen Monastic Institution in Medieval Japan,
Richard Payne's edited volume Re-Visioning "Kamakura" Buddhism, James H.
Foard's Ippen Shonin and Popular Buddhism in Kamakura Japan, Kenneth Kraft's
Eloquent Zen: Daito and Early Japanese Buddhism, Jacqueline I. Stone's Original
Enlightenment and the Transformation of Medieval Japanese Buddhism, and Bernard
Faure's Visions of Power: Imagining Medieval Japanese Buddhism have all been
significant contributions to the field of medieval Zen studies. Studies of Zen during
the modem era include James W. Reisig and John C. Maraldo' s important edited
volume Rude Awakenings: Zen, the Kyoto School, & the Question of Nationalism,
Ian Reader and George J. Tanabe's Practically Religious: Worldly Benefits and the
Common Religion of Japan, Bernard Faure's The Power of Denial: Buddhism Purity
and Gender, Noriyoshi Tamaro and David Reid's Religion in Japanese Culture, and
Brian Victoria's Zen at War and Zen War Stories. All of these works provide insight
into the transformation of Zen during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. These
scholars describe Zen as a dynamic social and political institution, which may be
viewed in contradistinction to the over essentialized depictions of Zen in scholarship
prior to the 1970s and 80s. As Williams notes, earlier scholars "tended to isolate the
Zen Buddhist tradition from both its sociohistorical context and the broader Japanese
religious landscape in which it was embedded, Zen was portrayed as a pure and
timeless truth."6 Thus, I find it necessary to reexamine the relationship between Zen
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Ibid.
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and the samurai, as the writings of previous periods neglect the social, economic, and
political influences on Japanese Zen.
Scholarship of Japanese history, which includes discussions of the samurai,
has undergone a similar transformation. Too often the scholarship prior to the 1970's
and 80's relied upon one-sided depictions of Japanese history, such as those found
within Suzuki's work. During the 1970s, however, new scholarship began to emerge
in Western countries that challenged the suppositions of previous works. Three
notable historians, John Whitney Hall, Jeffrey P. Mass, and Toyoda Takeshi produced
a number of carefully researched books and edited volumes that examine the history
and formation of Japanese society, parts of which are devoted to the evolution of both
religious institutions and the samurai warrior. John David Lu, during the same time
period, produced two informative volumes entitled Sources ofJapanese History,
which utilized historical documents to construct an accurate account of medieval and
early modern Japanese society. H. Paul Varley's Japanese Culture: A Short History
and Warriors ofJapan as Portrayed in the War Tales provide insight into the
complexity of the warrior class. More recently, Karl Friday's Samurai, Warfare and
the State in Early Medieval Japan, Samurai, Wa,fare and the State in Early Medieval
Japan, and Wayne Farris' Heavenly Warriors: The Evolution ofJapan's Military,
500-1300 have provided considerable insight into the complexity of the samurai

tradition during the medieval period. The works listed here have informed my
evaluation of samurai history and the information they provide is central to my
argument. These books have led me to view the samurai as a diverse collection of
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individuals whose religious practices, as well as their position within society,
fluctuated throughout their seven-hundred year history.
Despite the existence of these informative works, there are those, as I
mentioned above, who continue to report on the deep connections between samurai
and the Zen school. Winston King's work Zen and the Sword: Arming the Samurai
Psyche is a notable example of recent scholarship that continues the samurai/Zen
fallacy. In his book, King highlights some very basic connections between the early
warrior aristocracy and Zen temples during the Kamakura and Muromachi periods.
The patronage of Zen temples by the early bakufu is, in King's opinion, an indication
of the samurai/Zen connection. Not surprisingly, King's assertions are similar to
those found within D.T. Suzuki's work, Zen and Japanese Culture.7 The issue of
temple patronage will be discussed at length in chapter one, but it is worth noting here
that the problematic nature of earlier scholarship has not necessarily lost its grip on
contemporary discussions of Zen/samurai relations. An example of the continuation
of the Zen warrior fallacy that lies outside the realm of scholarship may be found in a
book by Scott Shaw, a martial arts instructor and author of Samurai Zen. Shaw, in an
effort to explain the spiritual side of martial arts, claims, "The cultivated enlightened
attitude which formed the framework for their [ the samurai's] martial art abilities and
their unique mental perspective in combat were both founded upon a philosophic
approach to life known as Zen Buddhism."8 This example is particularly instructive,
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See Daisetz T. Suzuki, Zen and Japanese Culture (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1 993). 62-69.
8
Scott Shaw, Samurai Zen (Boston: Weiser Books, 1999). ix.
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as it demonstrates how pervasive the fallacy of samurai Zen has become in America.
Shaw's assertions are particularly problematic because he does not provide the reader
with a bibliography or any direct references to historical research. While this would
be an unforgivable offense in a scholarly work, popular writings often engage in
lengthy discourses on "the nature of Zen" or what constitutes "Zen-ness" without
making specific references to Zen texts, teachings, or the historical development of
the tradition. 9
To further our understanding of this issue, it is helpful for the reader to be
cognizant of the ways in which Zen has been conceptualized in the West. Zen, more
than any other religious tradition I have encountered, has captured the popular
imagination of people throughout the world. From my conversations and through an
examination of popular media sources, I have found that the word "Zen" evokes a
variety of feelings and mental images. There are those who associate Zen with
feelings of tranquility or intense concentration. "Zen" is used to describe types of
architecture or styles of interior design. Once, while traveling in England, I
overheard a young American woman describe the gardens of Blenheim Palace as
"very Zen." Recently, a fellow graduate student pointed out an advertisement for a
health cereal called "Optimum Zen," a combination of organic foods, which is
9

Indeed, Zen has entered popular Westem discourse with little to no context. Those
who did speak of Zen at any length, such as D.T. Suzuki, often presented skewed
interpretations of Zen teachings. For example, Zen was sometimes presented as a
product of Japanese culture, despite the fact that Zen was imported from China and
Korea. Moreover, many Western Zen enthusiasts of the twentieth century viewed
Zen through the lens of political and social upheaval that surrounded American peace
movements. This led to a conceptualization of Zen that neglected the history of the
tradition and placed the Zen tradition in an American social context.
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described by the manufacturer as having a "Zensational taste." The famous Osho
retreat in Pune, India offers its residents a meditational style of tennis called
"Zennis."
These examples, despite their sometimes humorous nature, serve to illustrate
an important point regarding the conceptualization of the Zen tradition. Specifically,
that which some consider "Zen" does not always have direct ties with the historical
religious tradition of Japan. Some have developed a mental image of Zen that, they
assume, is undeniably associated with the historical religious tradition. This tendency
to essentialize Zen, or to assume that Zen is a clearly defined, unalterable religious
tradition, has contributed to the Zen/warrior connection. Many of the comments
regarding the Zen/warrior connection, such as those found in Shaw's book, are made
in a matter of fact fashion that assumes the connection, and the author rarely feels the
need to support his statements with quality research. Zen is seen as connected with
the warrior lifestyle because it fits into the observer's conception of the tradition. The
fact that Shaw is comfortable making assertions about the Zen/warrior connection,
and the fact that readers praise him for his insights demonstrates the need for a more
detailed examination of the historical ties between Zen and the samurai.

Methodology

This project is not without its hazards. The first and most apparent problem is
the fact that what scholars generally refer to as "samurai history" spans nearly seven
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hundred years.10 Obviously, Japanese culture underwent significant changes in this
time period; the behavior of warriors fluctuated depending on a number of political,
economic, and cultural factors. Indeed, throughout this time period, there were
numerous shifts in power as local lords (daimyo) struggled against other prominent
clans in an effort to expand their influence. Numerous families held the office of
shogunate, and leaders had their own distinctive political agendas and social
concerns.
One must also be cognizant of the fact that a warrior's duties and place within
Japanese society evolved over a period of about 1200 years. Although many
historians begin their investigation of "warrior history" with the twelfth century, there
were trained military specialists dating back to 500 C.E. However, many of these
"warriors" were conscripted soldiers, farmers or merchants who were required to
fight as part of their civil duty. Later periods, especially the Nara and Heian 11 , saw
the rise of trained military servicemen. These individuals were a kind of mercenary
who, while sometimes fighting for the Emperor, were members of small clans that
maintained groups of trained soldiers. During the Kamakura period and into the
Muromachi and Momoyama periods, these clans began to assume control of Japan,
and the shogun assumed control of Japan's central government. It was during these
time periods that possessing trained military servicemen became a necessity for each
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The actual time span is six hundred and seventy six years, if one uses the beginning
of the Kamakura period ( 1192) and the beginning of the Meiji restoration (1868) as
starting and stopping points.
11
All time periods will be detailed in Appendix one. Japanese terms will be defined
in a glossary in Appendix two.
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clan family, as families would often challenge each other for control of land. As the
warrior class became more defined during the medieval period, they began to assume
the role of local police and tax collectors. Their duty was, apart from fighting in any
large-scale battles, to act as land managers and to control the peasantry. This role
shifted, however, immediately prior to the Tokugawa era, as Toyotomi Hideyoshi
( 1 536-1 598) began the process of class separation. Hideyoshi issued a kenchi (survey
of land), which designated some citizens as farmers, or, if one was listed on the rolls
of the daimyo as fief holders or stipendiaries, they were officially a part of the warrior
class. 12 Also, Hideyoshi proclaimed that only warriors, as defined by the kenchi,
were allowed to carry long swords, thus distinguishing them from other members of
Japanese society. This trend of class separation continued into the Tokugawa era.
However, because of the relative peace of the Tokugawa period, and the fact that
warriors began to move into the cities, away from the farmlands, warriors assumed
the role of civil bureaucrats. In essence, these were not the fighting men of earlier
times, and most warriors from this point onward would not see combat.
Thus, the class of citizens I refer to as samurai includes a wide variety of
military servicemen. Quite often, the term samurai is employed in Western academic
circles, as it is in this thesis, to identify a group of martially trained individuals of
Japanese history. However, this term carries with it certain connotations in a
Japanese context, as it may be translated as "one who serves" or "one who attends"
the aristocracy. There are numerous terms in the Japanese language that might be
12

John Whitney Hall, Japan from Prehistory to Modern Times (New York: Delta
Publishing Co., 1 968).
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translated "warrior." Mononofu, tsuwamono, and bushi are all terms that apply to
warriors of different time periods. However, any term used in this thesis is intended to
designate an individual whose primary occupation was that of a military serviceman,
or, as in the case of the Tokugawa era, was designated as a warrior by the
government.
Zen institutions, too, underwent dramatic change from their infancy in the
Kamakura period to the Meiji restoration. Moreover, it is often difficult to examine
Zen apart from other extant Japanese religious traditions as Zen was often practiced
alongside Shinto, Confucianism, or other popular forms of Buddhism such as Pure
Land, or Tendai. It was not uncommon for Shinto deities to be housed in prominent
Buddhist temples, or for Zen adherents to familiarize themselves with Confucian
doctrine in conjunction with their Buddhist practices. Moreover, Japanese citizens
were often active participants of more than one religious tradition. Attempts to group
Japanese citizenry (which includes samurai) into strict sectarian religious categories
often results in a misrepresentation of Japanese religious practice. Thus, the religious
landscape of Japanese history is as equally complicated as the political fluctuations
that dominated much of the Medieval period.
It should be stated from the outset that it is not my intention to argue that the
relationship between the warrior and Zen is purely fallacious. The Zen school
achieved a rather high degree of popularity in Japan and one would be mistaken if
one supposed that there were no members of the warrior class who adopted Zen
practices. Samurai were, for the most part, just as much a part of Japanese society as
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other citizens and their religious practices coincided with the social attitudes towards
religious practice that dominated the Japanese populace at any given time. In other
words, members of the Japanese military class were no less and no more religious
than other individuals. In fact, there are stories and records of famous sword masters,
such as Takuan Soho, practicing Zen, or wealthy samurai families becoming patrons
of Zen temples. Thus, those who claim some intimate connection between Zen and
samurai are not wrong in every instance. However, these individuals have used these
basic associations to construct a shaky foundation for their argument that samurai had
some special affinity for Zen philosophy or that it was the de facto religion of the
samurai class. It is the misrepresentation or misunderstanding of historical fact and
the creation of tangential associations between samurai and Zen that will be the major
focus of this paper.
In many ways, my arguments do not depart from the mainstream of
contemporary scholarship on the topics of samurai history or religious studies. There
are those who have touched on the topic of samurai religious practices or the
problematic nature of nineteenth and twentieth century Zen scholarship in order to
dispel common falsities regarding the history of the Zen tradition. However, most
scholars deal with this issue as an extension of a separate argument, such as samurai
military history, or Japanese nationalism, and do not expound upon the topic at any
great length. Regardless, the myth of "samurai Zen" is still very much alive among
those who are not specialists in the area of East Asian history or know little about the
religious traditions of Japan. Moreover, the reliance upon texts that purport a
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connection between Zen and the samurai, such as works of D.T. Suzuki, Shaku Soen,
Kaiten Nukariya, and Inazo Nitobe, has not diminished significantly, despite the
publication of articles and books that highlight the problematic nature of such texts.
Thus, I feel it necessary to engage this topic in a more precisely articulated manner
than other scholars have done, so as to create a heightened awareness of the inherent
problems in positing a close relationship in which Zen is the core of samurai self
cultivation.
While a comprehensive historical analysis of such a large portion of Japanese
history is beyond the scope of this thesis, I will examine this topic through the use of
writings (both scholarly and those outside the realm of academia) that deal with the
supposed affinity between samurai and Zen. From this standpoint, we may examine
critically the popular fallacies regarding this relationship while simultaneously
developing a clearer understanding of Japanese political and religious history. I will
examine this problem from the standpoint of those who have made these assertions in
order to demonstrate the problematic nature of such arguments, but also to develop a
clearer understanding of the origins of this fallacy so that we may begin to see that the
relationship between Zen and samurai is not as explicit as some have suggested.
As I stated above, this investigation will require a reexamination of the
relationship between Zen Buddhism and samurai, a relationship that spans hundreds
of years. In order to address the historical development of these samurai and
institutional Zen, I have divided this thesis into three major sections. The first chapter
will deal with the relationships between government and religion both prior to the rise
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of the shogunate and Zen and the periods following their emergence. I will argue that
the alliances created between emerging Zen schools and the shogunate are not an
indication of any extraordinary religious fervor on the part of warriors, as King,
Suzuki, Blomberg, Nitobe and others have assumed, but represented a style of
communication and association between religious institutions and government
organizations that was, as far as Japanese society is concerned, the norm. The second
section will examine the periods including the unification of Japan under Oda
Nobunaga, Toyotomi Hideyoshi, and Tokugawa Ieyasu, and of the Edo period, which
saw the collapse of the shogunate and the rise of the Meiji Emperor as the sole ruler
of Japan. I argue that it was the events of these periods that led to the romantic
notions of the warrior lifestyle such as absolute devotion to one's lord, chivalry, and
deep religious conviction. It was during these periods that we see the emergence of
samurai as a truly distinctive class of citizens, an image that would capture the

imaginations of authors such as Soen, Suzuki, and Nitobe. Moreover, as I have
already intimated, the warriors of this time period were not the fighting men of
medieval Japan, a fact that will be taken into consideration as I examine some
writings from the time period. The third, and arguably most important section, will
deal with the rise of Japanese nationalism beginning during the Meiji period. I will
argue that it is the authors of this period who, writing from a nationalistic standpoint,
created the image of the Zen warrior and successfully transmitted this image to other
cultures, leading to the popular notion that samurai were strict Zen adherents.
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Chapter 1 : Buddhism and Japanese Polity

To begin our investigation, it is useful to examine briefly the development of
Buddhism in Japan and its relationship with the state, as this will provide us with
greater insight into the relationships forged between the shogunate and early Zen
institutions. Some authors have suggested that ties created between the early bakufu
and the emerging Zen school is an indication of the warrior's fascination with, and
adoption of Zen as his personal religion. For example, Winston King, author of Zen
and the Way of the Sword: Arming the Samurai Psyche, in a chapter entitled "The

Japanese Warrior Adopts Zen", notes that many early warrior rulers were active
patrons of Zen institutions, which, despite his sometimes vague arguments, 1 3 seems to
suggest a connection between samurai and Zen at the earliest stages of their
respective development. 14 Also Catharina Blomberg has argued, "Zen Buddhism
[during the early Kamakura period] seems to have held an immediate appeal for the
bushi, and gained many adherents from their ranks." 1 5 Heinrich Dumoulin claimed,

"It was during the Kamakura period that Zen first found entree among the Japanese
nobility. The virile discipline and the courage and indifference to death which Zen

13

For example, King makes the tentative argument that "it can perhaps be argued that
Zen was functionally present in an 'underground,' subconscious form"; and he also
states that the samurai's "uncanny awareness of danger [was] perhaps refined by Zen
training in some cases" Winston L. King, Zen and the Way ofthe Sword (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1 993). 243, 1 1 1 .
14
Ibid. 28-29.
15
Catharina Blomberg, The Heart of the Warrior: Origins and Religious Background
of the Samurai System in Feudal Japan (Kent: Japan Library, 1 994). 2 1 .
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inculcates by its stern training appealed to the warrior class." 1 6 David John Lu
claimed in his discussion of Kamakura Buddhism "samurai were by upbringing and
training self-reliant and could not always find themselves comfortable in the
teachings [of Pure Land] . . . to their spiritual quests, the newly formed Rinzai and Soto
sects of Zen provided the needed reassurance." 1 7 Kaiten Nukariya stated "As regards
Japan, it [Zen] was first introduced into the island as the faith first for the Samurai or
the military class, and molded the characters of many distinguished soldiers whose
lives adorn the pages of her history." 1 8
There is a degree of truth in the above statements. The bakufu of the late
Kamakura and Muromachi periods were indeed active patrons of the Zen school and
it was through their patronage that Zen institutions developed a foothold in the
religious and political landscape of Japan. As we shall see, however, the associations
between warrior rulers and Zen institutions were in many ways a continuation of
trends involving political alliances between governmental organizations and religious
institutions long before the rise of Zen or the warrior government. Moreover, we
shall also see that the bakufu's support of Zen institutions does not necessarily
suggest that there was any widespread acceptance of Zen among rank and file
samurai.

Heinrich Dumoulin, A History ofZen Buddhism, trans. Paul Peachey (Boston:
Beacon Press, 1 963). 1 79.
17
David John Lu, Sources ofJapanese History, vol. 1 (New York: McGraw-Hill
Book Company, 1 974). 1 1 4. Throughout his work, Lu provides transcripts of texts to
support his arguments in each chapter. Any documents to support his claims about
the samurai and Zen are, however, conspicuously absent.
18
Nukariya, The Religion of the Samurai. xvi.
16
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In order to demonstrate the above claims, I will provide a brief examination of
the major relationships between Buddhist institutions and the imperial court prior to
the rise of the Kamakura bakufu. In so doing, I will show that Buddhism, prior to the
advent of the Kamakura shogunate, was adopted in part as a political tool of the
imperial court. However, my discussion will not be limited to the ways in which
political entities exploited Buddhism. One must remember that Buddhist institutions
too had political opponents and their alliances with the imperial court were beneficial
to both the state and early Buddhist institutions. Indeed, as we shall see in my
examination of the Nara and Heian periods, Buddhist institutions achieved a level of
influence and power that allowed them to challenge the government on issues that
might disrupt Buddhist political hegemony. This, I will argue, was a major factor in
the early bakufu's decision to endorse and patronize Zen schools, for Zen was not an
established independent school of Buddhism at the time of the first shogun.
Consequently, the shogunate had an opportunity to further their influence through the
use of a religious organization that was not allegiant or subservient to the established
Buddhist institutions of Nara and Heian.

Early Japanese Buddhism and the State
The successful establishment and propagation of Japanese Buddhism in the
early sixth century was due in large part to the fact that Japanese Emperors and
statesmen patronized the religion extensively. The famous story found within the
Nihonshoki tells us that a Korean King presented Emperor Kinmei (509-57 1 ) with
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various Buddhist scriptures and images. According to the story, the Emperor was
immediately struck by the wisdom of the teachings, exclaiming: "Never have I heard
of such an exquisite teaching . . . Never have I seen anything so radiant and beautiful as
this Buddha image." 1 9 The Emperor consulted his vassals about the new religion,
which led to a heated conflict between the Soga clan, who advocated acceptance of
the new faith, and the Ononobe and Nakatomi clans, who were strong advocates of
Shinto and felt that the adoption of a foreign religion would offend the indigenous
kami. 20 Despite the objections of the Ononobe and Nakatomie clans Buddhism
would begin to flourish. Emperor Kinmei gave members of the Soga clan permission
to adopt Buddhism, which would replace Shinto as the official state religion in only
fifty years.2 1 As Hanayama points out, the early success of Buddhism was not
necessarily a result of deep religious conviction on the part of Kinmei and subsequent
rulers, despite the fact that a number of them are said to have personally adopted
Buddhism. Rather, the earliest debate over Buddhism was a political tool for the
Soga clan, with the victory of the Soga came (by extension) a victory for Buddhism. 22
According to Joan Piggott, the Soga clan had two reasons for its zeal.
First, they were extremely close to immigrants from the mainland who
themselves embraced [Buddhism] . . . Second, the Soga had an interest in
undermining the influence of rival advisors and ritualists . . . such as the
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Mononobe and Nakatomi, and the Buddhist cult provided one strategy for this
campaign. "23
While members of the Soga clan may have adopted Buddhism out of pure devotion to
the religion, they also began to recognize its power as a political tool. As we shall see
below, later political figures would also use their ties with institutional Buddhism to
enhance their political influence.
As mentioned above, some members of the Imperial Court began to adopt
Buddhism as their personal religion. Emperor Yomei (585-587) was perhaps the first
notable example, but his son Shotoku (574-622) is generally thought to have been the
first to extend more than a general friendliness to Buddhism. Indeed, beginning with
the reign of Empress Suiko (554-628), for whom Shotoku became Prince Regent at
the age of nineteen, Buddhism enjoyed a degree of patronage above what had been
given by any previous Emperor. Indeed, "cultivation of Buddhism as a royal cult
began almost from the moment Suiko took the throne."24 Empress Suiko and Prince
Shotoku' s propagation of Buddhism, as advocates of the Soga clan25 , was further
advanced following the death of Sushun, a leading member of the Mononobe clan and
outspoken anti-Buddhist. 26
One of the great accomplishments of Suiko' s court was the establishment of
the Seventeen Articles. Supposedly authored by Prince Shotoku himself, these
23
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decrees set forth a kind of courtly ethic and "proper hierarchical relations and
behavior . . . "27 The Articles also made clear the Emperor's intention to support and
propagate Buddhism. Article Two of this document reads:
Sincerely reverence the three treasures. The three treasures, viz., Buddha, the
Law and the monastic orders, are the final refuge of the four generated beings,
and are the supreme objects of faith in all countries. Few men are utterly bad.
They may be taught to follow it. But if they do not betake them to the three
treasures, wherewithal shall their crookedness be made straight?28
The boldness of this statement must not be overlooked. The Seventeen Articles seem
to be an attempt to create a political system in which the support and propagation of
Buddhism is a central theme, considering the fact that the Articles were geared
primarily toward Suiko's courtiers.
As mentioned above, Suiko was an ally and family member of the Soga clan,
who utilized Buddhism as a political tool against their Mononobe adversaries.
Shotoku, despite being a Jogu2 9 , was "whole-heartedly with the Soga."30 Indeed,
Shotoku is said to have patronized the foundation of several Buddhist temples,
including Shitenno-ji, "which became the center of social welfare activities in
Japan."3 1 The use of temples to extend the Emperor's control seems only logical and
may be noted throughout much of Japanese history. This is not to say the Shotoku
was not a serious student of Buddhism, or that his religious interests are in any way
tainted by his political aspirations. But it must be noted that Buddhism was utilized
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(consciously or not) as a means of advancing the Soga and Emperor's influence. It
should come as little surprise that members and friends of the Soga clan championed
Buddhist tenets over those of other extant religious organizations, as it was their
relationship with Buddhism that allowed them to extend their influence throughout
Japan. The construction of Buddhist temples allowed government officials to develop
centers throughout the country that were financially dependent upon, and
consequently, allegiant to the Soga officials.
Despite the aspirations of the Soga Government, Japan was far from a unified
country. While the Soga may have been moderately successful in extending their
influence, Japanese society was still very much defined by local allegiances, and the
idea of a unified nation was far from a reality. This is an aspect of Japanese political
and social history that would remain fairly constant until the Meiji restoration of
1 868. Most important for our purposes, however, is the fact that there were
concentrated efforts to develop a more centralized form of government and Buddhist
institutions were very much a part of this process. In the next section, we will
examine briefly the Nara and Heian political trends so as to show the ways in which
this trend was extended into later periods of Japanese history and led to the early
bakufu's support of Zen.

Nara and Heian Japan

The downfall of the Soga-centered government began in earnest in 645,
"when a radical clique led by the future Emperor Tenji [626-672] seized power by
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hacking their chief political opponents to pieces with swords and spears in the midst
of a court ceremony. "32 A number of the Soga clan members were assassinated,
including any contenders for the throne of Prince Shotoku's family. Shortly
thereafter, the new Emperor (Tenji) introduced a series of centralizing measures
known as the Taika Reforms. Before the Taika Reforms, Japan was ruled primarily
by a number of great houses and the role of the royal court was little more than to
serve as an intermediary between the great houses in matters of "national" concem. 33
However, these reforms granted the Emperor a degree of central power never before
seen in Japanese imperial government. Among other aspects of "national" interest,
the Emperor assumed control of all Japan's military resources. This was seen as a
necessary step due to the fear of invading forces from T'ang China, which had taken
over much of the Asian mainland in a series of military conquests. Along with the
Taika reforms came the ritsu-ryo codes, a system of legal or penal codes (ritsu) and
administrative codes (ryo), which would continue as Japan's legal system until the
fifteenth century34 Obviously, there was a concentrated effort during this period to
increase the influence and power of the Imperial government. Not unlike Suiko and
Shotoku, the imperial family would continue to use Buddhist temples as a means to
extend and intensify their control of land outside of the capital city.
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Perhaps the most noteworthy Imperial figure following the Taika reforms, for
our purposes, at least, was Shomu Tenno (70 1-756), who is regarded as one of the
great patrons of Buddhism. Shomu is most famous, in regard to his relationship with
Buddhism, for the construction of the Great Buddha (Daibutsu) and Todai-ji in Nara.
But Shomu also decreed that each province should establish its own national temple,
which would be ruled by a hierarchical system of intertemple relationships, Todai-ji
being the main temple.35 Shomu's motivations seem to have been heavily influenced
by his political aspirations, as Thomas Kasulis notes: "By establishing an official
Buddhist temple in every comer of the empire and by making himself the chief
Buddhist in Japan, Shomu was reinforcing his political position. The
institutionalization of Buddhism was proceeding hand in hand with the
institutionalization of the Japanese state."36
As noted above, the Taika Reforms granted the Emperor almost complete
control over Japan's military resources, but the centralizing effect of the Taika
included much more than military reforms. Indeed, as Joan Piggott notes:
Documentary and archaeological records indicate that provincial and district
boundaries were being drawn, administrative headquarters were being opened,
censuses were being taken, and fields were being distributed. Increasing
quantities of rice, cloth, and corvee labor made their way to Nara. .. A large
body of officialdom assembled in Nara; one expert has suggested that as many
as 10,000 persons worked for the government at mid-century.37
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The establishment of national temples in every comer of the country certainly aided
these changes as each temple acted as an extension of the central government,
allowing the Emperor to expand his influence beyond the boundaries of the capital
city.
The connection between the government and the above mentioned temples
was made obvious by the standardized nature of their construction. "A six-foot Shalrn
image was to join the previously ordered seven-story pagoda at one temple in each
province, and copies of the Golden Light and Lotus texts, partly brushed in gold ink
by Shomu's own hand, were to be sent to each temple."38 On top of that, the
oversight of each temple was placed in the hands of provincial governors, who were
allegiant to the Emperor. 3 9 While the centralization of Japanese government was not
achieved solely by the shrewd use of Buddhist temples, one can clearly see how they
were utilized to strengthen the Emperor's political influence.
Despite the fact that the imperial court utilized Buddhism to extend its
influence, we must be cognizant of the ways in which Buddhism began to dominate
parts of Japanese society as both a religious and a political institution. Indeed, it was
through the popular adoption of Buddhism and the patronage it received from the
imperial court that certain schools of Buddhism emerged as powerful institutions,
capable of influencing business of state. Moreover, Buddhist leaders were not
unaware of their political influence or their potential for social and political prestige.
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Thus, prominent Buddhists would often defend their positions fervently, as Mikael
Adolphson has noted,
The privilege of [a monk's performing rituals for the state] was accompanied
by a variety of benefits. Monks from the most prominent temples were
promoted to the highest religious offices in the realm. Donations of land, tax
rights, and funding for specific enterprises also reflected the recipient's
standing with in the court. . . It should come as no s�rise, therefore, that
religious centers jealously guarded these privileges. 4
As we shall see, the ties created between the Japanese elite and prominent Buddhist
monks led to the establishment of Buddhist institutions that held tremendous power
and had the ability to dominate much of the religious landscape of Japan prior to and
during the medieval period. Due to space limitations, I am not able to give this topic
as much attention as it warrants. However, we may establish some basic truths
regarding the domination of certain Buddhist institutions as it relates to our discussion
of Zen and the samurai.
The court moved from Nara to Heian (modem-day Kyoto) in 794 in part to
escape the Buddhist institutions that exercised tremendous influence over political
happenings in the capital.4 1 However, moving the capital, while enabling the
government to escape some of the more troublesome Buddhist schools of Nara, did
not result in any significant transformation in Buddhist/government relationships.
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Although the Kyoto court attempted to "encourage the activities of Buddhist prelates
who would devote their attention to spiritual rather than worldly matters" Buddhist
institutions would remain a significant influence over political happenings in the new
capital.42
Undoubtedly the most prominent example of a Heian-era Buddhist sect that
exerted a powerful influence over secular matters is the Tendai sect founded by
Saicho (767-822). The Tendai School made its home at the temple Enryakuji, which
was seated on Mount Hiei, northeast of Kyoto. Enryakuji, from its inception as a
Tendai Buddhist center, had intimate ties with the Heian court. Indeed, it was the
court that funded Saicho' s travels to China and provided financial assistance to the
school throughout much of its history. The location of the temple overlooking Kyoto
was seen as particularly favorable for it was from this position that it could serve as a
protector of the capital. Evil spirits were commonly thought to have come from the
northeast, making Enryakuji the most capable (geographically speaking) to protect
against invasions from such spirits.43 "Enryakuji could thus claim to be the "Temple
for Pacification and Protection of the State" (chingo kokka no dojo) . . . Enryakuji
supplied religious support to the state in return for the economic and judicial
privileges reserved for the country's elites."44 Through patronage from imperial and
aristocratic sources, Enryakuji grew into one of the most prominent religious
institutions of pre-modem Japan. "It became a vast complex of more than 3,000
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buildings, where priests engaged in a wide range of both spiritual and secular
studies. ,,45
Despite the fact that Enryakuji garnered a great deal of attention from the
Heian imperial court, there were other existing Buddhist schools and temples46 that
vied for imperial and aristocratic patronage. This, combined with the fact that both
prominent families and the imperial court desired moral and spiritual support, led to
competition between religious organizations which often resulted in protests,
demonstrations or violent attacks from religious institutions who feared their interests
were not represented equally in government policies. Following the relaxation of the
ritsu-ryo system,47 Enryakuji pecame particularly famous for its "evil monks"
(akusi5}, a group of monks who took up arms to fight for the interests of the temple.
The akusi5 "regularly engaged not only in fighting among themselves but also in
intimidating Kyoto into meeting their demands for such things as ecclesiastical
positions at court and titles to desirable pieces of estate land.',4 8
In another famous episode, monks from Enryakuji protested Emperor
Shirakawa's promotion of Toji (a Shingon temple) to a more prominent position
within the government. "In the third month of 1 108 Tendai monks complained to the
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court that a Toji monk had been wrongfully assigned to perform an esoteric ritual in
the capital.',49 According to tradition, Tendai and Shingon schools had been
appointed to perform rituals in alternate years. 50 The demonstrations by the
Enryakuji monks continued until the court promised to appoint a Tendai monk to
perform the next ritual. The fact that a Shingon monk had been appointed to perform
a ritual out of tum may seem like a relatively inconsequential happening, but so
intense was the competition between rival schools that any indication of favoritism on
· the part of the court was seen as a potential threat.
In another example of Enryakuji monks acting to protect their interests and
forcing the court to give in to their demands, monks took sacred kami emblems from
a shrine at the base of Mt. Hiei. These emblems were then transported to the capital
and placed outside the palace. "Since no one dared touch the car, activities simply
ceased in that part of the city until the monks, their demands met, condescended to
remove it and carry it back to the mountain."5 1 In this case one may also see the ways
in which Shinto had been assimilated by Buddhist institutions and used for their own
purposes.52
Clearly, the ties between the state and Buddhist institutions were complex,
and resulted in intense competition among Buddhist sects. While the above
discussion highlights some of the more extreme actions taken by Enryakuji monks,
49
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these actions are in many ways representative of the intensity with which religious
organizations defended ties to their patrons. The imperial court's desire to extend
their influence through the establishment of state-sponsored Buddhist temples and
their genuine desire for religious protection furthered the bonds between temple and
government. With that said, however, what may we say regarding the patronage of
Zen by the early shogunal governments? Did their patronage of Zen institutions
represent a unique devotion to Zen as some have suggested? Was their patronage of
Zen significantly different from the forms of patronage of earlier periods? In order to
answer these questions, let us tum our attention to the Kamakura and Muromachi
periods so we may begin to uncover the truth regarding the relationship between
warrior and Zen.

The Rise of Zen and the Warrior Government
The Kamakura era is commonly perceived as a watershed in Japanese history,
a period where the traditional imperial form of government was replaced by one
based upon a feudalistic, warrior-led system. This era is also seen as a time of
significant religious changes, where the established schools of Buddhism, such as
Tendai and Shingon, were gradually overshadowed by the advent of new schools
such as Zen, Pure Land, and Nichiren's Buddhism. However, these claims,53 while
grounded in kernels of truth, are not necessarily representative of what actually took
53
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place during the late tenth and early eleventh centuries. In order to engage the topic
of "samurai Zen" effectively, we must first develop a clear understanding of what
actually transpired during the Kamakura period so we may compare the warrior
government and their patronage of Zen with the forms of patronage from periods
prior to Kamakura.
The Kamakura period, beginning in 1 185, saw the rise of a new type of
political entity (the shogun) under Minamoto Yoritomo ( 1 147-1 199). The rise of the
Minamoto family came about when, in 1 156, a dispute arose as to who was to be the
next successor to the throne. The Taira and Minamoto each supported their own
candidate. The Taira family took control of Japan and established a rule that would
last until 1 185 . Between the years of 1 180 and 1 185, those allegiant to the Taira
fought the Minamoto clan in what was called the Gempei War, "which by 1 183 had
resulted in the ousting of the Taira from Kyoto, and the occupation of that city by the
forces of Minamoto Yoritomo."54 By 1 185, Minamoto was successful in defeating
his enemies in Kyoto, but rather than stay in Kyoto in an attempt to overtake the
imperial court, Minamoto established a headquarters in Kamakura without any
attempt to claim the throne for himself. "What came to evolve were two permanent
seats of authority and the particular form of dual governance that characterized the
early Kamakura age."55
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Along with this shift in governance came the influx of numerous "new" forms
of Buddhism. 56 For our purposes, we will remain entirely focused on the Zen school
(both Rinzai and Soto) and the relationships established between Zen and the
shogunate. The Tendai monk Eisai ( 1 1 4 1 - 1 2 1 5) is sometimes referred to as the
founder of Rinzai Zen in Japan. While this title is not necessarily in keeping with
Eisai ' s historical profile it is nevertheless appropriate to mention Eisai in conjunction
with the early propagation of Zen in Japan. Eisai traveled to China and studied under
masters of the independent Ch' an School. Upon his return to Japan, Eisai sought to
establish an extension of the Enryakuji temple system in which Zen meditation would
be a central form of practice. The leaders of Enryakuji did not, however, accept his
proposal. Eisai then traveled to Kamakura where the widow of Minamoto Yoritomo,
Hojo Masako ( 1 1 56- 1 225), made Eisai the head of a newly built temple.
While Eisai 's work together with Minamoto's widow is certainly noteworthy,
it does not necessarily represent a concentrated effort on the part of the shogunate to
patronize a Zen institution. Furthermore, the Minamoto family' s rule was relatively
short lived. It was not until the rise of the Hojo family that Zen institutions would
receive more than a general acknowledgement from the shogunate. Indeed, it was
under the Hojo regents that both Soto and Rinzai Zen received direct patronage which
included the construction of major temples in all prefectures, the sponsorship of Zen
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masters from China, and the establishment of hundreds of local, small scale Zen
temples.
The Ijira family is said to have gained some degree of closeness with the Hojo
shogunate after helping the Hoj o regents defeat Emperor Gotoba's ( 1 180- 1239)
forces during the Jokyu Disturbance of 122 1.5 7 The Ij ira family, in an effort to
establish control of land they had been granted by the Hojo regents, sought to
establish a temple (Hokyoji) "that would symbolize both their dominance over that
district and the permanence of their family's roots in the location."58 The Ijira family
chose a monk from Eiheiji, the temple established by Soto Zen founder Dogen Kigen,
to act as abbot for the newly founded temple. "The Ij ira . . .indicated their devotion to
the shogunate by expressly stating in 1278, and again in 1299, that Hokyoji was being
built in honor of the regent Hojo Tokiyori."59
Martin Collcutt has noted the importance of the Hojo regents in the diffusion
of the Rinzai Zen School. At the end of the thirteenth century, Rinzai Zen was
prevalent in only the major Japanese cities, namely Hakata, Kyoto , and Kamakura.60
However, the Hojo regents and the provincial warrior families under them advanced
the diffusion of Zen well beyond these major cities. "Under the Hojo patronage, the
system of official Zen monasteries [commonly referred] to as the gozan was
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beginning to take shape61 The gozan, or Five Mountain, system although not
officially adopted until the rise of the Ashikaga shogunate, established five large
temples around Kyoto, with Nanzenji as the head temple, and five temples in
Kamakura. These major establishments were given fist rank status, while a second
level of temples consisting of approximately sixty temples and a third rank of nearly
two hundred local temples worked under the authority of the major ten in Kyoto and
Kamakura.
These temples performed many of the same functions as those established by
Emperor Shomu and other imperial leaders prior to the Kamakura period. As Collcutt
notes, the young Hojo Takatoki "continue[ed] the two-pronged Hojo policy of
patronage and strict regulation.',62 Indeed, Takatoki invited the Chinese monks
Ch'in-cho Cheng-ch'eng, Ming-chi Ch'u-chun, and Chu-hsien Fan-hsien to
Kamakura where they were appointed to the headships of major Zen monasteries.63
Thus the Hojo bakufu, while strong patrons of Zen institutions, maintained control of
temples in order to ensure that the Zen monastic community did not ignore their
interests.
While the Hojo regents certainly began an intimate relationship with Zen
institutions, it was during the Muromachi period when the relationships between
bakufu and Zen were firmly established. The destruction of the Kamakura shogunate
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concentrated effort to defeat his adversaries in battle and return Japan to direct
imperial rule. The Ashikaga house, which once acted as supporters of the Kamakura
shogunate and actually held prominent positions within the Kamakura government,
turned on the weakened shogunate when Go-Daigo began his attempted coup d'etat. 64
Once the Kamakura shogunate had been destroyed, the Ashikaga house then ousted
Go-Daigo from Kyoto, and in 1338 set up a puppet Emperor. The head of the
Ashikaga house, Takauji ( 1305- 1358), established a new government in Kyoto,
naming himself as shogun. 65
It was during the Muromachi time period that the gozan system of
administration for the Rinzai sect of Zen reached its ultimate form. The Ashikaga
regents were particularly generous patrons of Zen; a number of Zen temples were
established by order of the Ashikaga following their settlement in Kyoto. However,
as King has observed, the relationship between Zen and the Ashikaga went much
deeper than the simple erection of temples: "With Ashikaga Takauji ... Zen priests
became the official advisers to the shogunate. Because Zen monks were the leading
scholars of the day, and numbers of them had been to the Chinese mainland, their
advisory role had a great influence of many aspects of official policy and national
life."66 However, the Ashikaga were not unlike their predecessors. As Akamatsu
Toshihide and Philip Yampolsky have noted, the relationship between the Muromachi
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bakufu and Zen followed the historical tendency of the Japanese aristocracy to
dominate Buddhist organizations and mold it to its own purposes. 67
Prior to the rise of Ashikaga, the gozan temples (in order of rank) consisted of
Nanzenji, Tofukuji, Kenninji, Kenchoji, and Engakuji. When Takauji assumed the
role of shogun, he altered the ranking to suit his purposes, establishing Tenryuji in
1 339 and making it a part of the gozan system. 68 This was done primarily to establish
the authority of the Zen temples in Kyoto over those remaining in the old Kamakura
capital. However, the Kamakura temples still had the ability to take precedence over
the Kyoto temples until Yoshimitsu (1 368-1 408) established Sokokuji in 1 382, which
shifted the balance of power in favor of the Kyoto temples.69
Temples of lower rank than the major gozan were also readjusted to fit the
needs of the new Muromachi leadership. The Jissetsu and Shozan temples, both of
which had been established during the Kamakura period, shifted their allegiance to
the new shogunate. The Jissetsu originally consisted of only ten temples, but in 1 380
Yoshimitsu revised the ranking, adding six new temples. 70 Thus, the title "Ten
Temples" became nothing more than a ranking system, which resulted in powerful
temples in the provinces rushing to claim Jissetsu status. The Shozan temples were
usually associated with important provincial families, a large number of which were
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Tendai, Shingon, Ritsu, Jodo, and Jishu.7 1 However, following the rise of the
Ashikaga bakufu, the vast majority of these temples changed their affiliation to Zen in
an effort to ally themselves with the new power in Kyoto. This had the effect of
further solidifying the new shogunate's influence throughout the Japanese
countryside.
Beyond the mere establishment of temples and the reconfiguration of their
rank, the shogunal government also controlled the superintendence of temple affairs.
"From the outset, the Muromachi bakufu contained officials known as tera bugyo
(temple magistrates) whose duty it was to supervise Enryakuji and the chief Nara
temples. For Zen, which the Ashikaga had a much closer connection, special
supervisory officials were established."72 Such actions not only allowed Ashikaga
shoguns to maintain control of the temples themselves, but by having governmental
representatives overseeing temple functions, they effectively extended their influence
to areas outside the maj or cities. As the temple administration system became more
stable, however, there was less need for the bakufu to assign personnel to the task of
overseeing temple affairs.73
The Ashikaga control of Zen temples was a cautious one. While they
established a presence in nearly every major temple, the Ashikaga also feared the
possibility of uprisings within the temples that might interfere with their control of a
particular region. Ashikaga Tadayoshi ( 1 306- 1 3 52) issued a proclamation in 1 340
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that prohibited the use or stockpiling of arms by those living in the temple.7 4 While
there were no serious instances of monks acting in any form of armed revolt, it was
common for them to band together in an effort to exact some change in temple policy.
"In 1 340 Engakuji was issued instructions by the bakufu that urged the head priest
and the monks to meet and discuss any problems that might arise between temple
authorities and monks . . . on occasions when a decision could not be arrived at it was
ordered that an appeal be made to the bakufu."75 In this way, the bakufu was able to ·
maintain considerable influence over the temples, while allowing monks and
administrators the ability to resolve problems on their own. Nevertheless, when a
decision was to be made, the bakufu remained the ultimate authority.
Yet another indication of the intimate relationship between Zen temples and
the Ashikaga was the bakufu's establishment of strict fiscal management.
A directive in 1 340 from Ashikaga Tadayoshi ordered that specific regulations
be established relating to the selection of the officers in charge of temple
shoen . . . Two years later, Tadayoshi sent a supplementary directive stating
that, because corruption was always a possibility when the same person
retained office too long, estate managers should be appointed for three-year
tenures.76
Major temples controlled and regulated reasonable sums of money, and sometimes
controlled multiple estates. Obviously, the Ashikaga were interested in maintaining
control over these assets if for no other reason than to ensure that they did not fall into
the hands of their adversaries. Of course, prosperous temples also performed
important ritual functions for the bakufu. However, the need to minimize corruption
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was seen as necessary in order to maintain mutually prosperous relationship between
temple and shogun.
There are obvious similarities between the patronage of Zen under the
Kamakura and Muromachi shoguns and the style of patronage we have seen from
earlier periods. In fact, the patronage of Buddhist institutions could be considered a
basic feature of early Japanese governmental policy. However, one aspect that is
missing from nearly every analysis of Japanese Buddhist history from Shotoku to the
end of the Muromachi period is a discussion of Buddhist practices among the
ordinary Japanese citizenry, which included warriors. Part of the problem, and a
reason why very few historical examinations of early Japan discuss the propagation of
Buddhism among the common citizenry, is the fact that Buddhism was, even into the
Medieval period, very closely associated with Japanese nobility. It was the imperial
court, the bakufu, or elite families who were the most ardent supporters of Buddhism,
and the most likely to leave any historical record of their dealings with Buddhist
monks. This is not to say that merchants, artisans, farmers, and military servicemen
were not aware or even active followers of Buddhist teachings. Indeed, there are
records of Buddhist priests from every sect performing rituals for, or in some way
addressing the concerns of commoners. However, it is difficult, if not impossible to
gauge accurately the degree to which Buddhism was adopted among common
Japanese citizens.
Part of this problem has to do with the difficulty one faces in labeling
Japanese religious practice. Although scholars may make sharp distinctions between
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Confucian, Buddhist, or Shinto practices, Japanese citizens, if they were religious at
all, would often participate in practices associated with different religious traditions in
one religious ceremony. For example, it was not at all uncommon, as we have seen in
our investigation of Enryakuji, for Buddhist and Shinto deities to be housed in one
complex and for the faithful to make offerings to, or otherwise recognize both sources
of religious authority at the same time. Thus, saying that one class of citizens was
adherents of a particular school or sect does very little to further our understanding of
Medieval Japanese religious practice, as these individuals were most likely adherents
of multiple religious traditions.
With that said, however, there is still a strong current within both popular
writings and scholarly works on Japanese religious history that suggests samurai
were somehow especially attracted to Zen as soon as it was introduced as an
independent school of Buddhism during the Kamakura period. As we shall see in
chapter three, I find this argument to be a product of Japanese thought during the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Nevertheless, those who support this claim
point to the adoption and patronage of Zen under the shoguns of Kamakura and
Muromachi as an indication of the warrior's fascination with Zen teachings. Let us
now evaluate these claims in light of the information we have noted above.

Conclusions

The above information is not intended to be a comprehensive examination of
the Kamakura and Muromachi bakufu and their relationship with Zen institutions.
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However, the historical survey presented in this chapter does allow us to make some
reasonably strong arguments against the idea of the "Zen warrior" during the early
medieval period.
The idea that the bakufu's adoption of Zen corresponds to a widespread
dissemination and adoption of Zen among warriors is tenuous at best. As we have
seen in our investigation, the fact that the shoguns were active supporters of Zen in no
way departs from normative government policy. The patronage of temples was both
a way for government officials to extend their influence into regions outside their
immediate control and a means of protecting Japan from any misfortune that could be
averted through religious ritual. Thus, is it any surprise that the shogunate continued
this process? Despite the fact that there may have been some true devotees of the Zen
tradition within the high ranks of the warrior government, the support of Zen temples
was also a handy political tool, and it would have been difficult for the early bakufu
to extend its control without establishing temples as centers of operation.
The fact that the warrior government adopted Zen rather than another existing
form of Buddhism is also commonly seen as an indication of Zen's appeal to the
fighting man. However, one must recall that the Buddhist institutions of Nara and
Kyoto already had intimate ties with the imperial court and had developed positions
of immense power, two factors that would limit the shogun's ability to exploit them
as political tools. Conversely, the Zen school was relatively new, and the Tendai
monks who advocated the creation of uniquely Zen institutions were often attacked or
ignored by the Tendai School. The shogunate had at its disposal a relatively young
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Buddhist organization, which sought the patronage of governmental organizations or
aristocratic families. It was unlikely for the imperial court to become active Zen
patrons because of their commitments to the Tendai and Shingon schools. Thus, the
shogunate, in an effort to extend its influence and provide the kind of spiritual
protection that was commonly associated with Buddhism, began to patronize Zen
above other schools.
A critical element of this portion of our investigation involves a description of
the samurai themselves. While this topic deserves more attention than I may provide
here, it would serve us well to be cognizant of what actually made one a "warrior."
As William Farris has noted, the term "warrior" is deceptively simple.77 Medieval
Japanese military servicemen cannot be placed into one broad social class, as many of
the authors presented at the beginning of this chapter have attempted to do. When
scholars refer to "warriors" of the medieval period, they are usually describing a
group of individuals who, having some expertise in martial techniques, served the
interest of either the shogun or one of the vassals allegiant to the shogun. However,
this description does not include all who fall under the category of military
serviceman. There were those who served vassals that had no connection with, or
were opponents of the shogun. 78 As Karl Friday has noted, "warrior houses were
proliferating all over the country, and military organizations outside Kamakura's
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vassal network were emerging . . . "79 Moreover, it is difficult to place a label on all
military servicemen of Medieval Japan, as "warrior" could include any number of
men from high ranking military positions to the conscripted peasantry. It is not
surprising that scholars choose to focus entirely on the military men associated with
the bakufu, as the rise of the bakufu marks a significant turning point in the political
structure of medieval Japan. However, we must not be too quick to confuse warriors
who were made politically powerful with those who maintained positions as rank and
file samurai. Sources do indicate that some shoguns became adherents of the Zen
tradition, but it would be a mistake to assume that the shogun in any way represented
the warrior class as a whole. In short, it is difficult, if not impossible, to speak of
"warriors" or "samurai" as a group of people who all shared common religious
beliefs, for the samurai were a diverse and dynamic part of Medieval Japanese
society. Certainly there were those who practiced Zen, and may have even come to
adopt it as their personal religion, but to assume that "warriors" were more interested
in Zen than any other group is reductionist and irresponsible.
As I mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, there are those who have
suggested that early samurai seem to have developed an immediate attachment to Zen
Buddhist teachings. Most of these statements are made without any real historical
evidence to support their claims. If any evidence is given, it is usually suggested that
the bakufu's patronage of Zen is analogous to a widespread adoption of the religion
amongst rank and file warriors. Or, statements are made with such hesitancy that one
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cannot determine whether or not the author is certain about his arguments. What may
be said with a degree of certainty, however, is that attempts to claim that Medieval
Japanese warriors were somehow more attracted to Zen than any other religious
tradition is an argument fraught with problematic assumptions and must not be
accepted uncritically.

46
Chapter 2 : Transitions in Samurai Life
Following the Azuchi-Muromachi period, Japan entered a time of dramatic
conflict and widespread civil war beginning with the Onin war and continuing under
the leadership of the "three unifiers:"80 Oda Nobunaga ( 1 534-1 582), Toyotomi
Hideyoshi ( 1 536-1 598), and Tokugawa Ieyasu ( 1 542- 1 6 1 6). These three men were
daimyo, but they, through a series of military campaigns, achieved a level of military
hegemony that was unprecedented. The level of political control exercised by
previous shoguns was limited, and one would be mistaken to assume that the
Kamakura or Muromachi bakufu controlled Japan as independent hegemonic forces. 8 1
Indeed, Japan was, despite the influence of the shogun, divided into small sectors,
which were controlled by local daimyo with differing levels of allegiance to the
shogunate.
This paradigm shifted, however, following the military conflicts of the
Azuchi-Momoyama period and especially following the establishment of the
Tokugawa shogunate. In this chapter, we will examine this period of warfare and its
effects on the social and political landscape of Japan. As we shall see, it was during
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the period following the civil warfare of the Azuchi-Momoyama period that led to the
creation of a samurai class that was thoroughly distinct from other social classes, and
to a significant transformation of the samurai lifestyle, which saw them transform
from fighting men into bureaucratic administrators. In regard to religion, we shall see
that this new class of samurai were some of the first to develop more complex ideas
regarding samurai ethics, but these ideas were not, as some have argued, the result of
samurai association with the Zen school. Indeed, the religious landscape of Japan

following the establishment of the Tokugawa shogunate was heavily influenced by
Confucian and Neo-Confucian ideals. While Zen and other Buddhist institutions
remained a prominent fixture in Japanese culture, the three unifiers' attitude towards
Buddhist institutions was cautious, as they were undoubtedly aware of a temple's
ability to thwart any attempt at hegemonic control.

The Warring States Period and Unification

The period of time commonly called "The Warring States Period" (sengoku
jidai) is a reference to nearly one hundred years of civil war, which ravaged much of

Japan. 82 The period began in earnest in 1467 following the outbreak of violence
between two of the Ashikaga shogun's great vassals, the Hosokawa and Yamana
houses, over a dispute regarding shogunal succession. Other vassals joined in the
fight and were eventually split into two rival factions and, over the ten year period
82
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which would come to be known as the Onin war, the two groups fought relentlessly,
leaving much of Kyoto and the surrounding countryside in ruins. More importantly,
at least in regards to the political realm of Japanese society, the Ashikaga shogunate
was left powerless, and a group of daimyo (sengoku daimyo) established individual
realms of influence with little or no allegiance to a centralized government. 83
Consequently, there began a period of intense rivalries among opposing clans as they
attempted to spread their influence through the acquisition and subjugation of
neighboring domains.
The ramifications of this shift in government were far reaching for the warrior
class. Throughout this time period, samurai became increasingly distinct from other
social classes, as Hall has noted,
Concentration of authority in the hands of the daimyo had lifted the level of
direct participation by the bushi class in rural affairs, drawing them toward the
castled center of the overlord's domain and thus releasing the peasantry to
work out of their own self-management. 84
Consequently, we begin to see the rise of a samurai culture that became increasingly
less involved in the lower echelons of Japanese society and concentrated more fully
on the immediate concerns of its daimyo and the task of warfare. The samurai of this
time period was indeed a warrior in every sense of the word. Fighting throughout the
sengoku period was endemic, and samurai as professional warriors were key players

in what was to become one of Japan's most violent historical periods.
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The religious landscape of the sengoku era was also different from previous
periods. As the bakufu and the Emperor became less influential, their ability to
support and establish religious institutions became increasingly difficult. Indeed, the
affairs of individual temples fell largely under the control of the daimyo who
controlled individual domains. Of course, imperial and shogunal support of religious
institutions did not cease completely, and temples such as Enryakuji and Toji were far
from financially bankrupt. However, some religious institutions took it upon
themselves to develop significant land holdings headed by religious officials and
small bands of warriors. The most noteworthy of such religious-led uprisings was the
lkk6 sect in Kaga, as the monks of this sect took control of an entire province.
In 1488 members of the sect under priestly leadership expelled the shugo85
from Kaga, and thereafter fot nearly a century the province was governed
through the priestly organization of the Honganji monastery in conjunction
with the lesser samurai and village heads of the province.86
Thus, some religious organizations were left to fend for themselves, while individual
domains became the center of authority, and the decentralization of government
produced an environment where "national" support of religious institutions was a
slowing trend.
The competition for lands naturally involved the consolidation of houses into
larger clusters as victorious families extended the borders of their holdings. By 1560,
a number of powerful houses had emerged, and the pursuit of national hegemony
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began. "Houses such as the Hojo, Uesugi, Imagawa, Ouchi, and Shimazu each had
acquired control over daimyo of several provinces and were able to put coalition
armies of formidable proportions into the field."87 The process of unification began
in earnest when the forces of lmagawa Yoshimoto ( 1 5 1 9-1 560), attempting to reach
Kyoto, were defeated by Oda Nobunaga's forces. Nobunaga thus became one of the
major players in the quest for hegemony, and he began the process of defeating his
competitors on the field of battle.
Nobunaga's next great achievement was the takeover of Kyoto in 1 568.
Following his successful attack on Kyoto, Nobunaga installed Ashikaga Yoshiaki
( 1 537-1 597) as the new shogun; with the sworn statement from Yoshiaki that
Nobunaga would make all political decisions. 88 However, the installment of Yoshiaki
was only a small step towards the hegemony that Nobunaga sought, as numerous
clans still held tremendous power in neighboring domains. Interestingly, two of
Nobunaga's greatest opponents were Buddhist organizations; the monks of Enryakuji
and the Ikko sect had both developed strong independent domains that were led by
the monastic order. Nobunaga's armies in 1 57 1 crushed the monks of Enryakuji,
,
"destroying three thousand buildings and slaughtering thousands of monks' g9 Luis
Frois ( 1 532-1 597), a Jesuit missionary who came to Japan in 1 563, captured the
horror of this incident,
Knowing that he had them all on top of the mountain, Nobunaga immediately
gave orders to set fire to Sakamoto and to put to the sword all those found
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within the town . . . the second thing that he did was to bum all the temples . . . he
also destroyed by fire the seven universities so that nothing at all was left of
them. Then deploying his army of 30,000 men in the form of a ring around
the mountain, he gave the order to advance to the top. The bonzes [monks]
began to resist . . . but they were un able to withstand such a furious assault and
were all put to the sword, together with the men, women, and children of
Sakamoto, which is near the foot of the mountain. 90
A similar fate would meet the monks of the Ikko sect, as Nobunaga destroyed their
landholdings in Echizen and Kaga only five years later.
As is evident by his utter disregard for the sanctity of these institutions,
Nobunaga had little respect for many of the religious institutions of his time, and he
sought to establish a government where religious organizations operated under his
strict control. This may have been due in large part to the fact that many Buddhist
institutions, following years of patronage from powerful families, had become corrupt
institutions. More likely, however, is that Nobunaga saw such institutions as
obstacles to his goal of hegemony. As we have seen in the last chapter, temples such
as Enryakuji exercised tremendous influence over the political affairs of Kyoto and
the surrounding areas. To leave such temples intact would have undoubtedly created
problems for Nobunaga's quest for hegemony. Thus, Nobunaga, unwilling to submit
to their authority, took the option of destroying them rather than engaging in
diplomacy.9 1
Nobunaga may have desired a secular state, but he was not unaware of the
usefulness of religious rhetoric in the establishment of dominance. N obunaga, not
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unlike rulers who came before him, attempted to incorporate Buddhist and Shinto into
his administration by confiscating large portions of temple territory and placing his
own agents over such religious establishments. 92 However, Nobunaga was not
content with mere cooperation of religious organizations, he sought to control them
completely. Also, Nobunaga attempted to establish himself as a kami. As Hall notes,
presenting oneself as a kami was one means of gaining legitimacy in the eyes of the
common people. 93 Thus, despite his disdain for powerful religious organizations,
Nobunaga was not unaware of the importance of religion in his attempts to become a
military hegemon.
The actions of Nobunaga's army leads one to question whether or not samurai
were the ardent supporters of Zen as so many have suggested. Would a warrior, as a
Buddhist, destroy monks, temples, and sacred Buddhist objects if they were devout
followers of the Zen tradition? Of course, this question is complicated by the fact that
many of the temples destroyed by Nobunaga were not, strictly speaking, Zen temples.
However, one must take into consideration the fact that Buddhist organizations,
despite having some differences in their approach to religious practice, were not
always divided along strict sectarian lines. Buddhist temples could and often did
intermingle, and a practitioner might just as easily incorporate multiple Buddhist
practices in their religious lifestyle. Thus, to claim that warriors were not striking out
against the Zen school, or that Zen schools emerged from the period of civil war
relatively unscathed is not necessarily true, as Pure Land or Tendai institutions often
92
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incorporated Zen styles of practice, or housed Zen monks. Moreover, Nobunaga's
armies did engage in the active destruction of Zen institutions, albeit on a slightly
smaller scale. A striking example is Yerinji, a Zen temple headed by the monk
Kwaisen (? - 1582), which was attacked by Nobunaga's forces after the monks
allowed some of Nobunaga's enemies to reside within the temple. According to
legend, Nobunaga had Kwaisen and other monks stand atop a gate as Nobunaga's
men set fire to its base, burning them alive. Examples such as these lead one to
question the suggestion that warriors were strict adherents of Zen, or any Buddhist
doctrine for that matter. 94
Nobunaga's reign came to a close when one of his own generals assassinated
him in 1582. Nobunaga was succeeded by one of his chief vassals, Toyotomi
Hideyoshi, who continued the process of unification. Hideyoshi created extensive
alliances with prominent daimyo, including Tokugawa Ieyasu, who would succeed
Hideyoshi after his death. Those families who presented themselves as opponents to
Hideyoshi were, over the course of some five years, systematically attacked and
overthrown. Essentially, the military unification of Japan was complete after the
defeat of the Hojo family of Odawara, one of the last strongholds against Hideyoshi
hegemonic push. It would, however, be mistaken to assume that the structure of
Japanese government was completely transformed. Most of the families that resisted
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Hideyoshi and Nobunaga through military force eventually surrendered and agreed to
an alliance. Consequently, Hideyoshi would establish defeated families as vassals
and would usually place them at the head of a province or city. Thus, Japan's
unification was achieved through the systematic suppression of rival daimyo and their
subsequent capitulation. However, Hideyoshi was not unaware of the potential for
uprisings to occur, thus "Hideyoshi. . . used what power and skill he had in working his
band of vassals to his own advantage. Where possible, he rearranged the disposition
of daimyo either for strategic reasons or to cut them away from their locales of major
strength."95 While Hideyoshi did make decisions that affected all of Japan, including
the establishment of a national currency and the making of foreign policy, most
administrative matters were left in the hands of local daimyo who maintained a
degree of autonomy. 96
Hideyoshi's attitude towards institutional Buddhism was slightly less
aggressive than that of his predecessor. Nevertheless, Hideyoshi recognized that
religious institutions could disrupt his position as hegemon. This is particularly
evident in an edict in which he discusses control of Mt. Koya under the Shingon sect
that headed the temple there. It reads, "If Mt. Koya invades another's estate, the
provisions in the document [granting control to the monks] shall become no longer
applicable. Thus anyone attempting such an act can cause the demise of Mt. Koya.
Use good judgment in this matter."97 This statement reflects much of Hideyoshi's
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attitude throughout his reign as military ruler of Japan. His was a tenuous control,
and much of his career was spent attempting to establish order.
Hideyoshi is best known for the establishment of strict divisions between
social classes. While the trend of samurai moving away from farmlands was, as we
have seen, already underway during the early sengokujidai, Hideyoshi, after a survey
of the Japanese population, promoted a new method for the division of land and the
identification of those found within the various provinces. As Hall notes, "Those
listed in the cadastral registers along with the assessed pieces of land, their families
and other attached personnel, were the hyakusho [cultivators]. Those who were listed
on the rolls of the daimyo as fief holders or stipendiaries were bushi."98 The
separation of classes was made firmer by the famous katana-gari (sword hunts), in
which local officials disarmed all non-military citizens and stated that only samurai
were allowed to carry swords. Hideyoshi also issued the three-clause edict, "which
froze the social structure and prohibited further class mobility or change of status. "99
This is particularly important in regard to our examination, as it was only in this late
period that we may begin to see the emergence of a truly dedicated class of warriors.
In previous periods, warriors may have held multiple occupations in conjunction with
their duties as soldiers. However, following the reign of Hideyoshi, samurai were
now fully distinct from other members of society and, more importantly, were not
permitted to engage in any other activity.
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Tokugawa and the Era ofPeace

Following the death of Hideyoshi, Tokugawa Ieyasu assumed the title of
shogun after suppressing others who sought the title for themselves. The time period
that would follow, commonly referred to as the Tokugawa or Edo period, is best
known for the relative peace that spread throughout Japan. The rule of the Tokugawa
shogunate lasted for nearly 250 years without any significant challenges, making it
one of Japan's most successful governments, at least in regard to its longevity.
Consequently, I will not be able to provide a comprehensive examination of the
Tokugawa period. However, it is entirely possible to note some generalities about
this era as it relates to the Zen/samurai association.
Although the samurai had emerged as a truly distinctive class, they were not
the samurai of old. Most of the warriors of this time period moved into cities or
towns and began careers as government bureaucrats. They were no longer expected
to manage lands or to act as provincial police forces. Moreover, because of the
relative peace of the time period, they rarely engaged in combat. Thus, the samurai
underwent a radical transformation in a relatively short period of time. A
consequence of this transformation was that many samurai began to reflect on their
roles as military servicemen, and some even began to write philosophical treatises
about proper warrior behavior.
A famous example of such a work is Hagakure ("Hidden in Leaves" or
"Hidden Leaves"), a collection of short stories and thoughts attributed to Yamamoto
Tsunetomo (1659- 1719). Within this work, Yamamoto addresses a variety of topics
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ranging from proper manners to in depth discussions of master/pupil relations. D.T.
Suzuki, in his discussion of Hagakure and the need for a warrior to be willing to give
his life at a moments notice, remarks, "When the unconscious is tapped, it rises above
individual limitations. Death now loses its sting altogether, and this is where the
samurai training joins hands with Zen." 1 00 Thus, Suzuki asserts that the warrior's
willingness to sacrifice his life for a greater cause is developed through Zen practice.
Also, Scott Shaw, in his discussion of the origins of bushido, a doctrine that he
considers to be steeped in Zen, cites Hagakure as a foundational document in the
formation of the samurai ethos.1° 1 What is interesting about this particular treatise,
however, is that Zen is rarely mentioned. Yamamoto does make reference to Zen
priests in his stories, but one would be hard pressed to argue that Yamamoto
considered Zen an absolute necessity for the warrior. When he does mention
religious practice, it is often in a fairly general manner. For example, in his first
chapter, Yamamoto states, "Every morning one should first do reverence to his
master and parents and then to his patron deities and guardian Buddhas." 1 02 It would
seem that Yamamoto's religious ethic is based upon a combination of Confucian
notions of filial piety and devotional forms of Buddhist and Shinto practice. To say
the least, this quotation contains little that would lead one to believe that Yamamoto
privileges Zen over other forms of religious practice.
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Another example of a Tokugawa era samurai whose writing deals with proper
warrior behavior is Musui 's Story, the autobiography of Katsu Kokichi ( 1 802- 1 850),
a samurai by birth who grew up in Edo. 1 03 In many ways, Katsu was the antithesis of
the "proper" warrior. He stole from his family, engaged in frivolous street fights, ran
away from home on two occasions, the second time leaving his family ( and bills)
behind, and was often reduced to begging on the street. What is interesting about
Musui's story is that he, like Yamamoto, makes no explicit references to Zen as the
foundation of samurai ethics. In the introduction to his autobiography, Katsu
provides a series of suggestions for his children in the hopes that they do not lead the
misguided life that he has. 1 04 At no point does he tell them to adopt any particular
religious practice, nor does he suggest that strict adherence to any one religious
tradition is necessary in order to live the life of a "proper" samurai.
Yet another text from the Tokugawa era that is commonly cited as containing
the basics of warrior ethics is the Budoshoshinshu, written by Daidoji Yuzan ( 1 6391730). This text was intended as a warrior's primer, and was written with younger
samurai in mind, as the title "Collection for Beginners in the Way of the Warrior"
suggests. One would think that such a text would include the basic foundations of
warrior ethics. Indeed, the text does contain a plethora of moral injunctions and
suggestions on how to live a meaningful and fulfilling life as a member of the warrior
class. However, once again, there is no mention of Zen as the foundation of the
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warrior ethos. To be fair, Daidoji does compare the life of the Zen monk to that of
the warrior. However, he only employs the image of the Zen monk to stress the
importance of self-sacrifice and constant vigilance, qualities that Daidoji believes are
embodied by those who enter monastic training. 1 05 Apart from this short selection,
the mention of Zen, Buddhism, or any religious tradition is absent from his work.
A counter example to Yamamoto, Katsu, and Daidoji may be found in the
writings attributed to the Zen monk Takuan Soho ( 1 573-1 645). D.T. Suzuki relies
heavily on Takuan as an example of how deeply rooted Zen philosophy had become
in the minds of warriors. 1 06 Takuan, in his famous text, Marvelous Power of
Immovable Wisdom, uses fencing to illustrate Buddhist ideas and Zen teachings. 1 07
Takuan, although he was not a sword master himself, and he does not discuss sword
fighting techniques, claimed that Zen practice could improve one's ability to fight and
to serve one's lord diligently. However, as William Bodiford notes, Takuan's essay
and "his advocacy of a Zen approach to mental training represented a minority
opinion amidst the predominantly Confucian inclinations of Tokugawa-period martial
treatises." 1 08 Thus, although Takuan's essay became one of the more famous pieces
of writing from the Tokugawa period, partly because it was emphasized by such
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prolific writers as D.T. Suzuki, Takuan was very much a part of the minority in his
efforts to establish Zen as a warrior's training aid.
It would, however, be incorrect to assume that Zen had nothing to do with the
samurai of the Tokugawa era. There is evidence to suggest that warriors turned to

Zen in the hopes of improving their martial skill. This is particularly evident when
one considers the fact that some religious adherents felt it necessary to prove that
their method of religiously assisted training would be most beneficial for the warrior
class. As Bodiford notes, Confucian instructors were especially vocal in their
disapproval of Zen as a military man's training aid. Confucianists claimed that
Buddhists were too far removed from worldly affairs, and Confucian teachers posited
a form of meditation that eliminated all aspects of Buddhist ritual. 1 09 The fact that
Confucian adherents felt it necessary to criticize the Zen tradition as an ineffective
training aid suggests that there were some who adopted Zen practices with the
specific intention of improving their martial skills. However, even if one is willing to
submit that samurai were using Zen as a training method, there is still little evidence
to suggest that warriors adopted Zen exclusively, or that it was privileged above other
religious traditions.

Conclusions

For those who have relied upon authors such as D.T. Suzuki, who presented
the Tokugawa samurai as a strict Zen adherent, the above information may come as a
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surpnse. There are romantics who would like to imagine the Tokugawa era samurai
as Zen warrior poets who, following their numerous combat experiences, composed
great philosophical works relating to the art of warfare and warrior behavior.
However, the sad reality is that most of those who composed such stories never set
foot on a battlefield. Thus, we must ask ourselves what we mean when we use the
term "warrior" to describe the Tokugawa era samurai.
The warriors of this time period, while maintaining some degree of closeness
with their martial history, became salaried officials. Each samurai family was ranked
according to their civil duties and the size of their stipend. At the same time,
shogunal decrees widened the gap between each official Japanese social class. As
Hall notes, "At the center of the Tokugawa conception of class hierarchy was the so
called "four class system," which placed samurai, farmer, artisan, and merchant in
what was assumed to be the natural order of descending importance." 1 1 0 Samurai, as
the highest class, were expected to behave in a certain fashion, and the bakufu
actually issued regulations (buke shohatto) designed to govern samurai behavior.
Whereas military training and service was once the prime concern of the warrior
class, the samurai of the Tokugawa era were encouraged by the central government to
become educated and to apply for jobs as bureaucratic administrators.
The kind administrative duties performed by a samurai, as well as the size of
their stipend, depended upon a number of factors. The Tokugawa bakufu
intentionally reduced the number of high power landlords in an effort to prevent an
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upnsmg. Consequently, if a samurai were to achieve any degree of prominence in
the Tokugawa government, they would have to gain the favor of either a high-ranking
daimyo, or the bakufu itself. This was complicated by the fact that the number of
samurai far exceeded the needs of the government. The incessant warfare of the
sengoku-jidai resulted in the creation of a massive class of warrior citizens, each of
whom, under the Tokugawa administration, was to seek employment within the baku
han system. 1 1 1 As a consequence, most han (domains) were overstaffed at almost
every level. 1 1 2 Thus, there were a number of low-ranking samurai households whose
stipends were barely enough to support a family.
Although there were those who promoted the use of Zen practice as a training
tool for warriors, it would seem that such overly philosophic approaches to martial
training would have been of little use to the samurai whose primary concern was to
provide for his family. In truth, "warrior training" during the Tokugawa period was
not necessarily done with the specific intention of becoming a more proficient killer.
Those warriors who had the luxury of pursuing martial training under a teacher
engaged in a kind of training that was more akin to modem-day fencing, as opposed
to fighting techniques that were designed to function in real combat situations. Katsu,
discussing his training in the martial arts, describes numerous instances where one
samurai would challenge another to a "duel." This style of fighting, however, was
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conducted with wooden swords, and the loser was typically identified as the first
fighter to be struck by his opponent's stick. This is not to say that such methods of
fighting did not require great skill and agility, but one does not get the impression that
these individuals were actually training for anything beyond harmless competition.
Thus, when Suzuki and Shaw suggest that Zen was involved in the training of
warriors during the Tokugawa period, we must be cognizant of the fact that spiritually
assisted training was probably a luxury enjoyed by those who could afford to devote
their attention to such matters.
Moreover, we must remain aware of the fact that those who presented the
warrior ethic as the exclusive property of the Zen School, such as Suzuki, Soen, and
Nukariya, did so because they viewed Zen through the lens of Japanese nationalism.
Zen was presented as the foundation of Japanese moral and spiritual superiority.
Thus, it should come as no surprise that these authors sought to magnify the
relationship between the warrior class and the Zen tradition, as the warrior was recast
to embody the patriotism of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century Japan.
The role of Zen in the life of the samurai during the Tokugawa period is an
ambiguous one. While there is evidence to suggest that some samurai adopted Zen to
assist them in their martial training, it is difficult to ascertain if this practice was
widespread. The absence of Zen in the works of Tokugawa-era authors such as
Yamamoto and Daidoji, further complicates the issue. If Zen were such an
indispensable aspect of samurai lifestyle, one would think that the first samurai to
speak at any length about their training or construction of morality would have
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mentioned the tradition somewhere in their treatises. Moreover, the complexity of the
Tokugawa class structure forces one to reconsider if the samurai of this time period
were warriors at all. What may be said with a degree of certainty is that there is no
evidence to suggest that the samurai of the Tokugawa period were strict adherents of
any one religious tradition, or that their construction of an ethical code was due to the
involvement of the Zen tradition.
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Chapter 3 : Zen and Japanese Nationalism

In this section, I will examine some of the literature that was created during
and inspired by the social and political upheaval during the era following the collapse
of the Tokugawa shogunate and the subsequent rise of the Meiji Government that
asserts ties between Zen and samurai. I intend to show that many of the prolific
writers during this era, attempting to create an intimate relationship between samurai
and Zen, influenced scholarly and popular attitudes of East Asian religious traditions,
ultimately culminating in the widely held opinion that Zen disciplines were a defining
characteristic of the samurai way of life. It is my contention that these views are
flawed for a number of reasons. First, much of the scholarship from Japan following
the Meiji revolution was influenced by nationalistic or ethnocentric rhetoric. Meiji
Buddhists, following a severe policy of governmental repression, were attempting to
lend legitimacy to their religion by allying themselves with the newly formed
Japanese war machine. Many of these writers, most notably Kaiten Nukariya, D.T.
Suzuki, Shaku Soen, advanced a militaristic version of Zen that was not grounded
firmly in historical research. Second, many of these authors gained a significant
following in the West, not only among casual students of East Asia, but among
scholars as well. This led to a widespread acceptance and diffusion of these thoughts
that resulted in a large body of scholarship based upon flawed principles. Lastly, I
will examine the explosion of interest in martial arts in the West, which advanced the
idea that Zen and the martial way were intimately connected. While this literature
had little influence on the scholarly community, it too created a vast amount of
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literature that contains erroneous ideas and furthered the notion of Zen being a
warrior's main religious refuge.
Admittedly, there were certainly samurai who were Zen adherents. It is not
my intention, as I have stated, to claim that samurai did not practice Zen, or that the
ideas put forth by the authors below are completely without merit. Indeed, there were
samurai who practiced Zen, as well as many other forms of Buddhism. The

relationship between shogun and the Zen school beginning in the Ashikaga period,
and the sheer popularity of Zen leads one to believe that some warriors must have
adopted it as their personal religion. Rather, the object of this chapter is to show that
the associations between samurai and Zen that were claimed following the Meiji
revolution are vast overstatements that have little grounding in historical research and
are ultimately a reactionary form of scholarship that resulted from the social and
political upheaval during the early part of the twentieth century.

The Collapse of Tokugawa and Rise ofMeiji

Near the end of the Tokugawa period, a series of Western trading companies
primarily from Great Britain, America, and Russia, attempted to establish ties with
the Japanese government. With the exception of the Dutch, who were "permitted to
retain a nominal presence on the tiny artificial island of Deshima in Nagasaki Bay,"
trade with Westem countries was generally frowned upon by Japanese citizens,
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including the Tokugawa shogunate. 1 1 3 Indeed, a general mistrust of foreigners was
commonplace as evidenced by a quotation from Aizawa Seishisai, the leader of the
Mito School. 1 1 4 It reads:
Some say the Westerners are merely foreign barbarians, that their ships are
trading vessels or fishing boats and they are not people who would cause any
serious trouble or harm. Such people are relying on the enemy not coming
and invading their land; they rely upon others, not themselves . . . If someday
the treacherous foreigner should take advantage of this situation and lure
ignorant people to his ways, our people will adopt such practices as eating
dogs and sheep and wearing woolen clothing. 1 1 5
The dehumanization of "the W estemers" is quite clear in this passage. The fear that
Westem powers would establish themselves and begin to dominate Japan both
politically and economically became a problem of serious proportions for the
Tokugawa shogunate, who maintained a strict attitude of isolationism in response to
growing Westem presence. Moreover, it is interesting to note that Aizawa
immediately regarded Westem traders as "treacherous" enemies that might somehow
force their "practices" on the Japanese people. It is this fear of the "West" that would
play a significant role in the fall of the Tokugawa shogunate and the subsequent rise
of the Meiji government.
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The Treaty of Nanking in 1 842, 1 1 6 which ceded Hong Kong Island by lease to
Britain, raised more fears of foreign takeover in Japan. 1 1 7 The failure of the shogun
in keeping foreign influences away led to a serious questioning of his authority.
Indeed, Michael Montgomery states: "In Japan, the outcome of the Opium War
brought a general realization that the march of events in the world outside was now
about to overtake the two-centuries-old Tokugawa strategy of isolation, and debate on
how the Westem threat to the Divine Land might be repelled was finally brought out
mto
the open. ,
·

,1 1 8

The apparent failure of the Tokugawa government to prevent foreign powers
from encroaching 1 1 9 on Japanese interests allowed the Meiji government, after battles
with the remaining forces loyal to the shogun, and other groups vying for power, to
take control of Japan. Indeed, as Ueda Shizuteru has noted: "Only fifteen years
elapsed between Perry's arrival and the Meiji Restoration in 1 868; yet so great was
the shock Japan experienced at the sight of Perry's Black Ships that this short span of
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time saw the total collapse of the Tokugawa feudal system that had been stable for
some 260 years. . . " 1 20 Not surprisingly, the Meiji government began a campaign to
abolish "foreign" influences in Japan, which included institutional Buddhism. One of
the first acts of the newly established government would be an attempt to restore
Japan to its "pure" Shinto religion while simultaneously cleansing the state of
Buddhism and those remaining loyal to the shogun. On April 6, 1 868, three months
after the Emperor issued a proclamation announcing that he was assuming control of
the government, the Emperor issued a Charter Oath with states, among other things,
"All absurd usages of the old regime shall be abolished and all measures conducted in
conformity with the righteous way of heaven and earth." 1 2 1 Shortly thereafter the
"Separation Edicts," which were designed to divorce Buddhism from Shinto, were
formally established under a new government organization known as the Office of
Rites. 1 22 Buddhist priests were no longer allowed to operate in Shinto shrines, give
Buddhist names to kami, and no Buddhist sanctuary could house images of Shinto
deities. Approximately three years after the establishment of the Meiji government,
the Emperor issued yet another edict, which firmly established Shinto as the de facto
state religion. It reads:
We solemnly announce: The Heavenly Deities and the Great Ancestress
established the throne and made the succession pure . . . Religious ceremonies
and government were one and the same and the innumerable subjects were of
a single mind . . . Beginning with the Middle Ages, however, there were
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sometimes seasons of decay and sometimes seasons of progress. Sometimes
the Way was plain, sometimes, darkened, and the period in which government
and education failed to flourish was long. But now in the cycle of fat, [ all
this] is reformed. Government and education must be made plain that the
Great Way of faith in the kami may be propagated. 1 23
In this passage, we are presented with what would become a common theme of the
early Meiji government, specifically that Shinto was the proper religion of Japan and
that other "foreign" religions (such as Buddhism) were inferior. The "period where
the government and education failed" is an obvious reference to the seven hundred
odd years of rule under the shogunal style of government. Moreover, we are
presented with what can only be described as a state sponsored religion, something
that institutional Buddhism would have to contend against in an effort to remain an
influential part of Japanese culture.
While the various shoguns of Japan were certainly active patrons of the Zen
school, their support for Zen is not analogous with the "reestablishment" of Shinto
during the Meiji restoration, which regarded Japan and all its inhabitants as having a
special connection with the divine. The connection between Zen and warrior
government, as we have seen, was a relationship based more on mutually beneficial
alliances than an attempt to establish an official state religion. The establishment of
the Zen School in Japan, while promoted by government officials, was not an attempt
to elevate Zen above all other forms of religion, or to establish it as the state religion.
It should be noted that the idea that Japan and the Japanese people were of
divine origin was not unique to the Meiji era. However, as Sandra Wilson states, "It
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was the conditions of post- 1 853 Japan . . . which fundamentally transformed the pre
existing ethnic identities and gave new si gnificance to cultural inheritances." 1 24 It
could be argued that this period effectively laid the groundwork for the rise of
Japanese nationalism as it would manifest itself in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century. The Meiji elite's distrust of forei gn influences would require them
to promote a nationalistic rhetoric in an attempt to unify the nation under one banner.
As Wilson has noted:
[F]or most of the Japanese population at the that time, nationalism was far
from an established orthodoxy . . . Local allegiances were more pressing than
national ones for most people . . . Nationalism thus had yet to be created,
implanted and propagated among the peorle . . . Much work was done during
the Meiji period to change this situation. 1 5
The rise of the Meiji government and its attempt to establish Shinto as the
national religion was by no means a process free of resistance. "Uprisings occurred
in a number of places, some of them armed uprisings, revealing a substantial level of
anxiety about the new conscription system and other government initiatives. " 1 26
Indeed, the overthrow of the Tokugawa regime and the subsequent establishment of
the Meiji government was largely initiated by a small elite of Japanese culture. 1 27
Not surprisingly, attempts to unite the Japanese population under a strictly state led
Shinto religious tradition were also met with resistance. "The faith of the masses of
the nation was then, as it is even today, a practically inseparable blend of elements
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drawn without distinction from Shinto and Buddhism alike. The authorities quickly
perceived that the forcible attempt to pry the two apart was creating a serious wound
in the very vitals of national life." 1 28 Protests against the anti-Buddhist attitudes of
the newly established government were commonplace. As Brian Victoria has noted,
"These protests started in the Toyama region in the late 1 870 and were followed by
two riots in Mikawa and Ise in 1 87 1 . In each of the following two years there were
also two major protests in a widely scattered parts of the country." 1 29
The social unrest in Japan inevitably led to changes in the Meiji government's
policies regarding religious practice. The first significant change came in 1 872 when
the Ministry of Rites, the organization that issued the Separation Edicts mentioned
above was transformed into the Ministry of Doctrine.
By far its [the Ministry of Doctrine' s] most important function 1 30 • • • was to
propagate the "Great Teaching . . . " The three pillars of this teaching were as
follows: ( 1 ) the principles of reverence for the national deities and of
patriotism shall be observed; (2) the heavenly reason and the way of humanity
shall be promulgated; and (3) the throne shall be revered and the authorities
obeyed. 1 3 1
The significance of this change was that Buddhist priests were now given a degree of
involvement in the new government. To ensure that the ideals of the "Great
Teaching" were firmly established, the government created a position known as a
Doctrinal Instructor. "By establishing the position of Doctrinal Instructor, . the state
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was creating a defacto state priesthood . . . [of which] more than 8 1 ,000 of a total of
some 103 ,000 officially recognized Doctrinal Instructors were Buddhist priests." 1 32
As the anti-Buddhist movement began to weaken, governmental officials
turned their attention to new ideas regarding the relationship between religion and the
state. In the Meiji Constitution of 1 889, Buddhists ( as well as other religious
organizations) were given a degree of religious freedom. It reads: "Japanese subjects
shall, within limits not prejudicial to peace and order, and not antagonistic to their
duties as subjects, enjoy freedom of religious belief." 1 33 The significance of this
proclamation in relation to Buddhism was that Buddhists were now given (at least
officially) the right to practice distinctly Buddhist rituals without persecution.
However, the state maintained a great degree of control over the religious institutions
of Japan by stating that they may only practice as long as religious practice is "not
antagonistic to their duties as subjects." Thus, the ultimate responsibility of every
priest, according to the Meiji Constitution, regardless of their religious affiliation, was
to interests of the state.
One may pose the question: Why, after such hostility towards Buddhism, did
the Meiji government elites change their attitude towards institutional Buddhism
within such a relatively short time? An observation made by Wilson is particularly
helpful in answering this query. She states,
Given the relatively strong feeling of national identity common to the elite
levels of Meiji society, in a context where the unequal treaties with Western
countries significantly infringed Japan's sovereignty and autonomy, it became
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an urgent task for Meiji leaders to encourage the rest of the population to
identify with the nation-state, and in particular to become more willing to
c. 1t.
· 1 34
make sacn"fitees 1or
What may we conclude from this? On one level, there was a systematic attempt to
suppress Buddhism and establish a state religion based upon Shinto. On another level,
there was the attempt to establish a unified state. It would have been difficult for the
Meiji elite to promote a vision of the state that was hostile towards Western colonial
powers, dedicated to the rule of an Emperor and, most importantly, united in the
desire for Japanese sovereignty when such a significant portion of the population had
been alienated. While Buddhism may be, technically speaking, a foreign religion, it
had been a part of Japanese society since the sixth century. Thus, designating it as
"foreign" meant very little to a Japanese family whose ancestors had practiced the
religion for generations. The quick action of the Meiji government to relax its
hostility towards Buddhism seems to indicate that it realized its mistake. However,
institutional Buddhism had been dealt a significant blow. During the early
suppression of Buddhism, "[ a ]pproximately 4,500 Buddhist temples and halls were
eliminated. The priests housed in these temples were returned to lay life, and those
between the ages of eighteen and forty-five were immediately sent to become
teachers in domain schools, while those under eighteen were sent back to their
families." 1 3 5
This raises another interesting question: Why would institutional Buddhism
go on to support the ideals of their former oppressors, the Meiji government?
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Buddhists in Japan did not necessarily represent a direct challenge to the views of the
Meiji elite in regard to the sovereignty of Japan or the negative perception of Western
powers. Indeed, Buddhists were generally hostile towards non-Japanese influences as
well, particularly towards Christian missionaries. As Victoria has noted: "The early
Meij i period critique of Christianity, which continued on through the end of the era,
may be considered one of institutional Buddhism's first responses to the West. " 1 36
While Buddhism did undergo a period of persecution, it was relatively short lived.
The Meiji elites that were hostile towards Buddhism were hardly representative of
popular Japanese opinion, as evidenced by their failed attempts to establish a state
based purely upon their version of Shinto. Thus, it could be argued that the period of
Buddhist suppression is merely a failed attempt at producing a "new" state, rather
than a situation where institutional Buddhism espoused a completely different view
from the Meiji elite.
As Peter van der Veer has noted in his work Religious Nationalism: Hindus
and Muslims in India, " . . . the centralizing force of nation building itself sprouts
centrifugal forces that crystallize around other dreams of nationhood: nationalism
creates other nationalisms-religious, ethnic, linguistic, secular-but not a common
culture." 1 37 This observation is particularly helpful in understanding the situation
described above. While the Meiji elites had their own form of nationalism in mind,
they could not construct a common culture from their own limited ideas of how the
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nation should be organized. Thus, it is conceivable that the Meiji government felt
they should relax their attacks on institutional Buddhism in order to preserve the
feelings of nationalism that were supported by the majority of the Japanese populace.
Japan would undergo significant changes in the period following the Meiji
revolution. The initial fear of encroaching W estem powers was eventually
overshadowed by Japan's desire to become an imperial state. Following the Sino
Japanese War ( 1 894- 1 895) 1 3 8 , Japan emerged victorious after China signed the Treaty
of Shimonoseki, which declared Korea independent and gave Japan control of the
Liaodong peninsula. However, the Tripartite Intervention, a diplomatic movement
consisting of Russia, France, and Germany, forced Japan to return the Liaodong
peninsula to China, and stripped Japan of its first colony on the Asian mainland.
It was at this point, following what many Japanese citizen and government
officials considered a national humiliation, that Japan took actions to develop a
powerful modem military machine. Japan added new divisions to its army, organized
both cavalry and artillery, established factories for the production of munitions and,
by 1 903 , had developed a fully functional navy with seventy-six vessels. 1 3 9 Shortly
thereafter, Japan defeated Russia in the Russo-Japanese War ( 1 904- 1 905). Not only
had Japan become the only Asian nation to defeat a Western power in modem
military conflict, they also gained control of Lushunkou (also known as Port Arthur),
and forced Russia to evacuate Manchuria, and to recognize Korea as a Japanese
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holding. 1 40 Japan was on the road to becoming a serious imperial power. In 1911,
Japan was recognized by Western powers (in a formal treaty) as an independent
nation. 1 4 1
It was during the Sino-Japanese conflict and the years leading up to the
Second World War that the greatest amount of writing was published to promote
what has been called "Imperial Way Zen" (kokoku Zen). During the Russo-Japanese
conflict, Zen priests expressed their support for the war by performing special sutra
recitation ceremonies, and a number of Buddhist temples had become detention
centers for Russian prisoners of war. Also, the Japanese government fully endorsed
the creation of Soto Zen missions in China and Korea. These missions, while taking
on the outward appearance of religious institutions were "simply one part of Japan's
colonial administration, the ultimate goal of which was to propagate the benevolent
influence of the Emperor." 1 42

Zen and Bushido as Models ofExcellence

As Robert Sharf has noted correctly in regard to the revisioning of Zen
following the Meiji restoration, " . . .it was no coincidence that the notion of Zen as the
foundation for Japanese moral, aesthetic, and spiritual superiority emerged full
force. . . just as the Japanese were preparing for imperial expansion in East and
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Southeast Asia." 1 43 Indeed, as the feelings of nationalism grew within the fabric of
Japanese society, numerous institutions, both political and social, became involved in
the propagation of nationalistic rhetoric. We have examined, albeit briefly, the
degree to which Zen institutions were involved in this process, but we must also be
cognizant of how these processes led Zen adherents to promote a vision of their
religion that was in full support of the modem Japanese war machine, a vision that
sometimes entailed placing embellishing both the history of Zen and Japanese history.
One of the most common trends in this regard was the various attempts to
compare the modem Japanese military servicemen (gunjin) with the samurai warrior
and their supposed adherence to the code of bushido. 1 44 In the minds of these writers,
the samurai and bushido were irrefutably linked with the Zen tradition. One such
author was Inazo Nitobe ( 1 862- 1 933), an educator and professor whose work
Bushido: The Soul ofJapan, suggests ties between bushido, Zen, and the modem
military serviceman. Discussing the sources of bushido, Nitobe wrote,
I may begin with Buddhism. It furnished a sense of calm trust in Fate, a quiet
submission to the inevitable, that stoic composure in sight of danger or
calamity, that disdain of life and friendliness with death. A foremost teacher
of swordsmanship, when he saw his pupil master the utmost of his art told him,
"Beyond this my instruction must give way to Zen teaching." 1 45
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While this example does not speak directly to the issue of modem warfare, it does
establish a link between the code of bushido and the Zen school. Nitobe would,
however, go on to suggest that bushido was still very much alive in the spirit of the
Japanese people. He wrote: "[bushido], the maker and product of Old Japan, is still
the guiding principle of the transition and will prove the formative force of the new

era." 1 46 This statement, while lacking any instruction for an application of the
bushido code, still promotes a view of Japanese culture as supporting the ideals of the

warrior class, an idea that permeated much of Japanese scholarship during this time
period.
While Nitobe 's book makes little reference to the Zen school specifically, it is
undoubtedly an attempt to draw parallels between the code of bushido and the
modem soldier. A much more explicit example of an attempt to draw parallels
between the usefulness of Zen and bushido for the modem military is provided by
Shaku Soen, who published a book in 1 9 1 9 entitled A Fine Person, A Fine Horse. An
excerpt of this book reads:
The power that comes from Zen training can be called forth to become
military power, good government, and the like. In fact, it can be applied to
every endeavor. The reason that bushido has developed so greatly since the
Kamakura period is due to Zen, the essence of Buddhism. It was the
participation of the Way of Zen which, I believe it can be said, gave to
1 o 1ts
bush.d
· great power. 1 47
Not only does Soen assume that the benefits derived from Zen practice can be applied
to any endeavor, he also posits that Zen is what gave bushido its "power." Perhaps
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even more startling is that Soen describes Zen as "the essence of Buddhism,"
effectively ranking Zen above all other schools of Buddhism in Japan. One is
reminded of Sharf s observation presented above. We must be cognizant of the fact
that religious institutions were, in some ways, pitted against one another in an attempt
to become the most influential tradition in the new Japanese empire. Peter van der
Veer has observed that " . . . the centralizing force of nation building itself sprouts
centrifugal forces that crystallize around other dreams of nationhood: nationalism
creates other nationalisms-religious, ethnic, linguistic, secular-but not a common
culture." 1 48 Indeed, the politically created nationalism of the Meiji government
effectively created various other nationalisms within the fabric of Japanese society,
Zen nationalism being one example. Thus, as is evident in Soen's writing, Zen
institutions began to promote themselves as ardent supporters of the Japanese
government's imperial aspirations. Soen not only suggests that Kamakura Zen was a
founding principal of bushido, an argument that has little foundation in historical
research, but also that Zen has always been a source of power for those who wish to
develop a strong military. Also, Soen makes a tenuous connection between Zen and
the samurai warrior of Medieval Japan in an attempt to draw parallels between
warriors and modem military servicemen so as to emphasize the importance of Zen in
the history of Japanese warfare.
D. T. Suzuki, a pupil of Soen and one of the most widely recognized authors in
the field of Zen studies, also wrote extensively on the topic of Zen and the samurai
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wamor. One of his more famous works, Zen and Japanese Culture, 1 49 contains three
chapters devoted entirely to a discussion of the samurai. Suzuki, discussing the
relationship between the Zen schools and the warrior class, had this to say about Zen
practice as it relates to the samurai:
He [the samurai] could never be separated from the weapon that was the
supreme symbol of his dignity and honor. Training in its use was, besides its
practical purpose, conducive to his moral and spiritual enhancement. It was
there that the swordsman j oined hands with Zen. 1 50
While his arguments have little grounding in historical research, Suzuki 's assertions
are representative of a current within the Zen school, which attempted to draw
parallels between the Zen of Medieval warriors and modem military servicemen.
Indeed, Suzuki wrote:
. . . Zen discipline is simple, direct, self-reliant, self-denying ; its ascetic
tendency goes well with the fighting spirit. The fighter is to be always single
minded with one object in view: to fight, looking neither backward nor
sidewise. To go straight forward in order to crush the enemy is all that is
necessary for him . . . Intellectual doubts . . . are great obstructions to his onward
movement, while emotionalities and physical possessions are the heaviest of
encumbrances . . . A good fighter is generally an ascetic or stoic, which means
he has an iron will. This, when needed, Zen can supply. 1 5 1
This excerpt contains much of the rhetoric that typified an imperialist view of Zen
practice and the valor of the "fighting spirit" during the early twentieth century.
Suzuki begins with a description of Zen discipline that is designed to fit the lifestyle
of the soldier. He assumes that the only concern for the military man should be to
crush his enemy, and any obstructions to this ultimate goal should be removed,
1 49
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essentially in order to make him a more proficient killer. One cannot help but notice
that Suzuki was attempting to make a vague comparison between monks and warriors
when he describes the best warriors as ascetics or stoics, thus making the ties between
Zen and warrior all the more intense. Suzuki uses such allusions to promote Zen in a
modem setting. As Kirita Kiyohide has noted in response to Suzuki's discussion of
the samurai: "The context of these remarks was the warrior class in Japanese history,
not the military in the modem state, but it seems a short and logical step to substitute
soldier for samurai and thus apply Zen's spiritual composure and its transcendence of
life and death to the present world as well." 1 52
What may we gather from Nitobe, Soen, and Suzuki in regard to the creation
of a national identity? All three men assume that the code of bushido and the ideals
of the medieval warrior were ( 1 ) steeped in Zen rhetoric (2) profoundly more potent
because of the involvement of Zen practice and (3) quite applicable to modem times.
Ultimately, this creates an image of the modem soldier as a continuation of legendary
samurai warriors who fought with unflinching devotion. The opinions of these
authors do not represent a minority opinion. Fueoka Seisan wrote: "Zen
enlightenment is not a question of ability, but of power." 1 53 Or, as Iida Toin, a Soto
Zen priest wrote: "We should be cognizant of how much power Zen gave to the Way
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of the Warrior. It is truly a cause for rejoicing that the Zen sect has recently become
popular among military men." 1 54 The idea of the modem soldier as a kind of quasi
samurai gave the military a more intimate connection with the past, but also provided

a romantic model of excellence to which each soldier should aspire. 1 55 The Japanese
soldier' s identity was thus crafted into a combination of religious rhetoric and
historical prowess, both of which were designed to lift the morale of the soldiers
fighting for imperial Japan.
In truth, bushido was not a common ethical system of the medieval samurai
warrior, or for warriors following the medieval period. As Karl Friday notes:
"Hanging the label of bushido on either the ideology of the Imperial Army or the
warrior ethic of medieval Japan involves some fairly overt historian' s sleight-of
hand." 1 56 Indeed, the term bushido was rarely used in reference to the warrior until
the late nineteenth century, and was only created during the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries by samurai who were, as we have seen, bureaucrats and
administrators as opposed to actual fighters. 157 Nitobe's work, which did more to
popularize bushido than any other publication 158 , is fraught with inaccuracies.
154 Ibid. 1 0 1 .
155 It is worth noting that Western audiences are not the only groups to develop
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Although the term bushido had been used prior to the Meiji period, Nitobe believed
that he had invented the word himself. 1 59 Nitobe held no advanced degrees dealing
with Japanese history. In fact, much of his academic career was spent studying
English until he went to school in Hokkaido where he became a Christian and studied
agricultural economics. 1 60 Thus, Nitobe was not the most qualified individual to
discuss aspects of Japanese religious and military history.
The ideas put forth by Nitobe and the other writers presented above were a
direct result of the ultranationalism that permeated much of Japanese society until
Japan's defeat in 1945. Bushido was a cultural phenomenon. Kaiten Nukariya called
bushido the "religion" of Japan, Takagi Takeshi wrote a treatise comparing bushido
and chivalry, and Inoue Tetsujiro produced a collection of Edo period essays which
were used in conjunction with bushido ideals to develop Japan's military. 1 61 The fact
that Zen adherents wanted to become involved in this process is hardly surprising, as
stood to benefit from their association with Japanese nationalism. However, Zen was
not unique in its association with nationalism, as members of other religious
organizations attempted to align themselves with bushido in order to demonstrate
their ties with "old" Japan. Uchimura Kanzo, a Japanese Christian, argued, "Bushido
is the finest product of Japan . . . Christianity grafted upon Bushido will be the finest
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product of the world. It will save, not only Japan, but the whole world." 1 62 Thus, Zen
practitioners were not the only ones who claimed to reap benefits from their
association with bushido. However, Zen adherents were unique in that they claimed
Zen to be the religion of the samurai. Before evaluating this claim, however, let us
examine more closely the extreme forms of nationalism in Japan during the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and the involvement of the Zen school in the
propagation of nationalistic rhetoric.
Kurebayashi Koto, a Soto Zen scholar and priest, once claimed, "Wherever
the imperial military advances there is only charity and love. They could never act in
the barbarous and cruel way in which the Chinese soldiers act. This can truly be
considered to be a great accomplishment of the long period which Buddhism took in
nurturing [the Japanese military]" 1 63 It is difficult to reconcile these statements with
the reality of Japanese wartime atrocities such as the massacre at Nanking. Iris
Chang describes the horror:
The Japanese poured into Nanking on December 1 3 , 1 937, occupying
government buildings, banks, and warehouses, shooting people randomly in
the streets, many of them in the back as they ran away. Using machine guns,
revolvers, and rifles, the Japanese fired at the crowds of wounded soldiers,
elderly women, and children who fiathered in the North Chungshan and
Central roads and nearby alleys . . . 64
Of course, it is unlikely that the news of the Nanking takeover reached Japanese ears
in such horrific detail. Nevertheless, Japanese citizens were led to believe that their
nation "lay at the center of world morality and that the Japanese were superior to all
162
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other people." 1 65 Thus, any news of imperialist expansion was often regarded as a
victory of superior people over less advanced cultures. Sugimoto Goro, a decorated
soldier and ardent supporter of the Zen school wrote extensively on the relationship
between Zen and the imperial state. Writing on Dogen, the founder of the Soto Zen
School, Sugimoto stated:
Zen Master Dogen said, "To study the Buddha Dharma is to study the self' To
study the self is to forget the self. To forget the self means to discard both
body and mind. To discard beyond discarding, to discard until there is
nothing left to discard . . . This is called reaching the Great Way in which there
is no doubt. . . In this way the great spirit of the highest righteousness and the
purest purity manifests itself in the individual. This is the unity of the
sovereign and his subjects, the origin of faith in the Emperor. 1 66
Sugimoto's problematic interpretation of Dogen's philosophy notwithstanding, it is
unquestionable that Sugimoto saw Zen first and foremost as a supporter of the state.
For Sugimoto, the "Great Way" is exemplified by the "unity of the sovereign and his
subjects," a reinterpretation of Buddhist doctrine that was intended to show support
for the Emperor and Japanese imperialism.
Similarly, Omori Zenkai ( 1871-1947), a Soto Zen leader also writing about
the relationship between Zen and the state, followed Sugimoto' s claims closely. He
wrote:
The essence of the practice of a subject is to be found in the basic principle of
the Buddha Way, which is to forget the self. It is by giving concrete form to
this essence in any and all situations, regardless of time or place, that
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Buddhism is, for the first time, able to repay the debt of gratitude it owes the
state. 167
Omori Zenkai skillfully uses the Zen Buddhist ideal of "no-self' and reinterprets the
goal as a kind of selflessness where one abandons one' s individualism and replaces it
with total allegiance to the state. Another Soto Zen master, Yamada Reirin,
suggested, "All Buddhists, regardless of sectarian affiliation, must come forward to
do their great duty in support of imperial rule." 168
The degree to which citizens of Japan were urged to show their loyalty to the
state is also evident in the writing of Harada Daiun Sogaku, the master of the
American born Philip Kapleau. In Kapleau's famous work, The Three Pillars of Zen,
he wrote of his teacher: "Nowhere in Japan will you find Zen teaching set forth so
thoroughly and succinctly, so well suited to the temper of the modem mind, as at his
monastery. Having been his disciple for some twenty years, I was enabled, thanks to
his favor, to open my Mind's eyes in some measure." 1 69 It is interesting to note, as
Victoria does, that Kapleau seems totally unaware of his teacher's previous ties to
Japanese militarism. In an article entitled "Be Prepared, One Hundred Million, for
Death with Honor!" Harada wrote: "It is necessary for all one hundred million
subjects to be prepared to die with honor . . . If you see the enemy you must kill him;
you must destroy the false and establish the true-these are the cardinal points of
,
Zen_, 110
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As Robert Sharf has suggested: "Zen has had to reinvent itself repeatedly in
the face of shifting political, social, and economic circumstances." 1 7 1 The above
writings represent a systematic reinvention of the religion by both scholars of Zen and
Zen masters alike, all of whom emphasize the importance of allegiance to the state by
utilizing religious (specifically Zen) rhetoric. In each case, the aspects of Zen that
support the Japanese imperial government are described as rudimentary elements of
Buddhist practice. Daiun called them "the cardinal points of Zen," Omori Zenkai,
"the essence of practice" and Sugimoto Goro utilized Dogen, the founder of Soto Zen
in Japan. In this way, these writers assume that for a citizen to practice Zen, they
must recognize that Zen is, in its most basic form, a religious institution that supports
the state. If someone were to ignore such a stipulation they would, in effect be
disregarding a fundamental aspect of religious practice. Thus, a form of
religious/state identity was promoted not just within the military, but also among all
adherents of Zen.

Conclusions: The Zen/Samurai Connection Reconsidered
In light of the prominence of Zen nationalism during this time period, we must
reexamine the statements made by writers in this and previous chapters. One must
remember that samurai, like the American cowboy or the European knight, became
legendary figures, and are romanticized in legends, novels, and, more recently,
television shows, movies, and even video games. One need not go far in Japan, or
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America for that matter, to find such materials. There are internationally recognized
films such as Akira Kurosawa's Seven Samurai or John Logan's The Last Samurai,
graphic novels such as Lone Wolfand Cub by Kazuo Koike and Goseki Koj ima, a
virtual cornucopia of animated titles (anime) such as Samurai Champloo, and video
games like Samurai Showdown or Way of the Samurai. Such forms of media are
often highly stylized and unrealistic, with samurai performing tremendous acrobatic
fighting skills or simply acting in a manner that is inconsistent with historical reality.
Nevertheless, these depictions are an excellent indication of the degree to which both
Japanese and non-Japanese recognize the samurai as a legendary historical figure.
Karl Friday captures this fact succinctly when he writes: "It would be difficult to find
any facet of Japan's cultural heritage that exercises as powerful a hold on the world's
popular imagination as the samurai." 1 72
The samurai was also a legendary figure in the time of Suzuki, Soen, Nitobe,
Nukariya, and other authors we have examined above. The fact that Zen became
associated with the warrior class is more a result of the samurai 's usefulness to Zen,
rather than of any deep historical ties between the two groups. Indeed, it is difficult
to find any quality historical research into the Zen/samurai relationship by those
authors presented above, or any author who posits a deep relationship between the
two. As we have already seen, the historical ties between warrior and Zen, while not
completely nonexistent, hardly support the claims made by those during the late
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nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Thus, we must try to understand why
associations between Zen and samurai were drawn during this time period.
The most apparent reason for the association is, of course, the very fact that
samurai represented, in the minds of many writers, a kind of military excellence.
Samurai were presented as noble warriors, men whose unflinching devotion and

stalwart disposition allowed them to carry out their duties with efficiency and grace.
We cannot, however, accept such depictions uncritically, for the samurai were not
necessarily the devoted warriors that Nitobe, Suzuki, and others would have us
believe. This is not to say that there were not samurai who could be considered
exemplary military men, or that the ideas presented by the authors of the nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries were complete fabrications. Nevertheless, we must be
aware of the fact that the samurai of these authors are not necessarily an accurate
reflection of the historical warrior. Samurai from the eighth century onwards were
essentially hired hands, contractual workers whose allegiance was determined by
their own self-interest. As Karl Friday has noted,
Medieval warriors remained loyal to their lords only so long as it benefited
them to do so; they could and did readily switch allegiances when the
situation warranted it. In fact there are very few important battles in Japanese
history in which the defection - often in the middle of fighting - of one or
more of the major players was not a factor. 1 73
Thus, the depiction of samurai as warriors who fought out of pure devotion is not
necessarily in keeping with the actual warrior tradition.
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However, the authors o f the early modem and modem periods were, as we
have seen, not necessarily concerned with historical accuracy. Theirs was a message
designed to lend credence to the importance and usefulness of the Zen school in a
social environment in which devotion to the state was of the utmost importance.
Aligning themselves with the samurai, the legendary fighting men of old Japan,
allowed Zen institutions to remain at the forefront of the Japanese nationalistic
movement. The samurai, in popular imagination, was an archetype, and those
speaking for Zen were joining the ranks of the propagandists by aligning themselves
with such a legendary figure. Of course, Zen authors were not the only group to
recognize the usefulness of samurai in the process of nation building. Government
officials, too, consciously utilized doctrines such as bushido and images of the
devoted warrior as propaganda tools. The ideals of the warrior were manipulated into
a doctrine that was designed to support the modem state and their war machine.
Indeed, The Imperial Rescript to the Military of 1 8 82 stated that bushido "should be
viewed as the reflection of the whole of the subjects of Japan." 1 74 Such statements
were typical of the Japanese propaganda machine of the modem period, and the
above quotation captures effectively the use of warrior related material to boost
morale and increase nationalistic attitudes among the Japanese populace. Is it any
surprise, then, that Zen would become part of such a process?
Answering this question requires one to come to terms with the fact that Zen,
despite its injunctions against the taking of life, was actively involved in the Japanese
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war machine. Brian Victoria, in his works Zen at War and Zen War Stories,
expresses a certain degree of remorse over the fact that Zen schools were so heavily
involved in the making of the modem Japanese military machine. However, Zen
institutions prior to the modem period were also very much a part of Japanese polity
and it is, in some ways, naive to think that religious institutions are unconcerned with
the social climate of their nation, or that religious leaders will take the moral high
ground on issues of national policy. One must be cognizant of the fact that the
Japanese Zen tradition of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was not
immune to the nationalistic attitudes that permeated much of Japanese society.
Indeed, to go against the tide of nationalism would have been disastrous for the
religious leaders of the time, as nationalism had gained such wide acceptance among
the Japanese populace. Many Japanese Zen adherents were willing, if not eager, to
align themselves with the imperial movement.
We must also remember that Japanese Buddhist institutions were particularly
eager to prove their allegiance to the state. It was not long before the rise of authors
such as Suzuki that members of the Meiji government significantly repressed
institutional Buddhism. Despite the failure of the Meiji's Shinto-led form of
nationalism, Buddhists would have certainly been eager to align themselves with the
new imperial state so as to avoid further persecution. In so doing, Zen schools
demonstrated their usefulness to the national movement. It is not coincidental that
Zen adherents began to emphasize their relationship with the medieval warrior just as
Japan was in the process of building a thoroughly modem military. The image of the
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samurai was placed firmly within the mold created by Zen authors who wished to
express their allegiance to the state by extolling their successes with the warriors of
old, even if such stories were not based on any significant historical research. 1 75
The Japanese were not the only ones, however, to advance the image of the
"Zen warrior." Western, particularly American, audiences adopted the image of the
Zen warrior as a result of the popularity of works by fi gures such as Suzuki, Nitobe,
and Nukariya. Suzuki, in particular, gained a significant following in America, and
he is often regarded as a key fi gure in the "Zen boom" of the late 1 950' s. 1 76 Those
who adopted Zen and participated in its propagation were often reliant on the works
and speeches of figures such as Suzuki, as there were little in the way of East Asian
studies, either in the academy or in popular literature, to redress these simplifications.
Consequently, many accepted Suzuki 's assertions regarding the Zen tradition
uncritically. As interest in Japanese studies began to grow in the latter part of the
twentieth century, scholars began to see that Suzuki's Zen was not necessarily an
accurate depiction of the tradition. At the same time, however, there were many
within the field of scholarship who used Suzuki ' s writings as the basis of their
understanding, thus furthering misinformation within the academy.
Martial artists, too, helped to further the Zen warrior myth following the end
of the Second World War. Of course, figures such as Suzuki inspired much of this
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development, as Suzuki would often argue that Zen was not the exclusive property of
Zen schools. Rather, he argued, "Zen is to be found in the Japanese spirit as
expressed in secular arts and in bushido." 1 77 It was this image of Zen, combined with
the humiliation that martial arts instructors suffered following Japan' s defeat and
occupation by Allied powers, that led many martial artists of the 1 950's to adopt a
"Zen" label. 1 78 Prior to the allied takeover of Japan, physical education was usually
conducted in an authoritarian or military fashion. "In 1 94 7 school curriculums in
"physical training" (tairen) were officially renamed "physical education" (taiiku) to
signal that henceforth they would emphasize democratic ideals, individualism, and
sports instead of militaristic discipline." 1 79 Many martial arts instructors, however,
would adopt Zen to "enhance their charismatic power" and to maintain authoritarian
teaching methods. 1 80 The explosion of Japanese martial arts in America resulted in
the spread of fighting styles that used Zen as a method of instruction. This
connection quickly led to further propagation of the Zen warrior connection among
western audiences.
This chapter intended to demonstrate the degree to which Japanese
nationalism of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries led Zen adherents to
advance an image of their religion, which was fully a part of the modem Japanese
imperial state. In so doing, these writers constructed an image of their religion as
being a foundational element of the samurai lifestyle, an argument that has little
1 77
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foundation in historical research. It is, as I have stated, no surprise that Japanese Zen
adherents chose to emphasize their association with the warrior class j ust as Japan
was building an army. The samurai were the legendary fighting men of the Japanese
tradition, a fact that led both Zen institutions and government offices to emphasize
their versions of warrior behavior so as to strengthen the nationalistic bonds that were
deemed necessary for Japan to rise as a modem military power.
The repercussions of this attempt to unite samurai and Zen under the banner
of nationalism were far-reaching. Students of Zen, both in Japanese and Westem
settings, adopted many of the imperial assertions uncritically, leading to the
widespread adoption of these ideas and further commentary on the relationship
between samurai and Zen. In short, this was a generation of writing that was based
upon flawed information. That such imperial rhetoric still permeates much of the
literature dealing with samurai and the Zen tradition is a testament to the fact that
these assertions are still very much alive in the popular imaginations of scholars and
casual students alike. However, when viewed more comprehensively, one can see
clearly the degree to which Japanese nationalism led to the creation of samurai Zen,
as opposed to proving any longstanding relationship between the two.
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Conclusions
In many ways, this thesis raises more questions than it answers. My primary
concern was to deconstruct the problematic arguments by authors such as D.T. Suzuki
and Shaku Soen, not to provide an exhaustive survey of warrior history. In the future,
I would like to see scholars examine the relationship between Zen and the warrior in
greater detail. It would be especially helpful if one were able to locate and examine
more original source material. In particular, one would do well to find letters,
journals, or official declarations written by warriors prior to the Tokugawa period.
Also, one might search for writings of monks and nuns who may have had close ties
with a warrior so as to determine to what degree members of the monastic community
saw themselves as advisors to the warrior.
While it is difficult to determine to what extent Japanese warriors adopted Zen,
the information presented above is intended to force us to reconsider the ties between
Zen and samurai. It is not the intention of this work to deny completely the idea that
warriors were active practitioners of Zen, or that Zen teachings may have aided the
warrior in the execution of his duties. Rather, this work is designed to make us
question the ways in which the Zen/warrior relationship has been constructed. For
too long, scholars and students have relied upon data regarding the Zen/warrior
relationship that has no grounding in quality historical research. Moreover, there are
few within the field of scholarship that have given this topic more than a cursory
treatment, thus allowing the propagation of misinformation.
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To truly appreciate the complexity of this issue, one must be cognizant of the
fact that the warrior has been immortalized in the popular imagination of both
Japanese and Westem audiences. In many ways, the image of the Japanese warrior as
a determined, skilled, and brave individual is not unlike the valorization of military
servicemen from other countries and cultures. One needs not go far in America, or in
country for that matter, to find memorials that depict military servicemen as great and
praiseworthy individuals. Such depictions are tied closely to national pride, and the
Japanese warrior has been presented as a model of military excellence since the late
nineteenth century. Thus, the warrior has taken on a mythical persona, and
exaggerations regarding his ethical standards or martial abilities are a product of the
warrior being mythicized.
Those who spoke of the warrior as a strict Zen adherent were often themselves
very closely tied to the Zen tradition. It comes as little surprise that they would
present one of Japan's most legendary figures as being an adherent of their religious
tradition. One must remember that the authors of the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries who supported Buddhism had just witnessed the persecution of
their religious tradition at the hands of the Meiji elite. At the same time, Japanese
citizens began to adopt a nationalistic mindset as Japan built a modem military.
These two events resulted in the creation of a nationalistic version of Zen that utilized
the image of the warrior as their model. It is no coincidence that Zen adherents began
to present their religious tradition as a vital tool for the serviceman just as Japan
began the process of military expansion. As we have seen, the image of the warrior
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was used as a propaganda tool to inspire Japanese servicemen and to increase feelings
of nationalistic pride. It should come as no surprise, then, that Japanese Zen
adherents began to imagine the warrior's abilities as a product of Zen teaching.
Ultimately, I cannot say with confidence to what extent warriors adopted Zen,
as the sources I have utilized provide little information in that regard. However, what
can be said with a fair degree of confidence is that the supposed ties between Zen and
the warrior are questionable. We must not lose sight of the fact that warriors were an
eclectic group of people, whose religious, political, and economic loyalties fluctuated.
To suggest that the Zen school represented the basis of the warrior's lifestyle is
irresponsible. Thus, we must reevaluate many of our suppositions if we are ever to
get past the mythical samurai and discover the truth about the religious practices of
the warrior.
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Appendix 1 :
Japanese Historical Timeline From Asoka to Meiji
Asoka period (538-7 1 0)
538-550 -- Buddhism is introduced to Japan from Korea and China, beginning with
Emperor Kinmei (509-57 1).
604 -- Prince Shotoku (574-622) promulgates the Seventeen Articles.
645 -- The Taika reforms (Taika no Kaishin) are introduced.

Nara period (7 1 0-794)
7 1 0 -- Nara is established as the first permanent capital of Japan.
Buddhism receives patronage from the imperial court, especially from Shomu Tenno
(70 1 -756).

Heian period (794- 1 1 85)
794 -- The capital moves to Heian (present day Kyoto).
806 -- Establishment of Tendai Buddhism on Mt. Hiei.
Tendai School gradually emerges as a dominant school of Buddhism in Heian.

Kamakora period (1 1 85 - 1 333)
1 1 85 -- Minamoto Yoritomo ( 1 14 7- 1 1 99) becomes the first shogun of Japan
--Eisai ( 1 141 - 1 2 1 5) travels to China and, with the assistance of H6j6 Masako ( 1 1 561 225), establishes a new temple that taught Zen styles of meditation.
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--"New" forms of Buddhism (Zen, Pure Land) emerge.
--Dogen Kigen establishes the Soto sect of Zen.
--BakuJu becomes active patrons of the Zen school.
--Early versions of the gozan temple system are established.

Muromachi period (1333- 1568)
--Ashikaga Takauji (1305-13 58) takes over the position of shogun.

-- Gozan temple system becomes firmly established.
--Ashikaga bakufu become avid patrons of the Zen school.
1467-1477 -- Onin war.
--Portuguese traders and Christian missionaries establish connections with Japan.

Azuchi-Momoyama period ( 1568-1600)
1568 -- Oda Nobunaga (1534- 1582) begins the process of unification.
1582 -- Nobunaga is murdered and succeeded by Toyotomi Hideyoshi (1536- 1 598).
1588 -- Hideyoshi begins the "sword hunts."
1 598 -- Hideyoshi dies of natural causes.
--Samurai established as official class of citizens.
1600 -- Tokugawa Ieyasu ( 1542- 16 16) succeeds Hideyoshi.

Tokugawa (Edo) period (1600- 1868)
1603 -- Ieyasu becomes shogun and establishes capital in Edo (present day Tokyo).
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--Relative throughout the Tokugawa period.
--Significant transformation of the samurai class.
--Commodore Matthew Perry forces Japan to open ports for trade.

Meiji period ( 1 868- 1 9 1 2)

1 889 -- The Meiji Constitution is established.
1 894- 1 895

Sino-Japanese War.

1 904- 1 905

Russo-Japanese War.

1 9 1 0 -- Korea is annexed.
--Growing trends of nationalism and the development of a modem war machine.
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Appendix 2:
Glossary
Akuso -- "Evil monks." Buddhist monks of the Tendai temple Enryakuji who took
up arms to fight for the interests of the temple .

Bakufu -- "Tent government." The administrative authority that ruled Japan under
the leadership of a shogun.

Budoshoshinshu -- "Collection for Beginners in the Way of the Warrior." A
collection of moral inj unctions and guidelines for proper warrior behavior
specifically designed for younger samurai.

Bushi -- "Warrior." One of the many terms used throughout Japanese history to
designate a class of military servicemen.

Daibutsu -- "Great/Large Buddha." The name given to large statues of the Buddha.

Daimyo -- "Great name." This term refers to feudal lords who controlled small
sectors Japan.

Gozan -- "Five Mountain." A network of temple administration with one temple
acting as the head.
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Hagakure -- "Hidden in Leaves." A work attributed to Yamamoto Tsunetomo that
contains proscriptions for proper warrior behavior.

Hyakusho -- "Cultivators." Members of Japanese society whose main occupation
was farming.

Kami -- "god." Deities associated with the Shinto tradition.

Katana -- "Sword." Usually used in reference to the longer sword carried by the
warrior class.

Katana-gari -- "Sword hunt." The collection of swords from non-warrior citizens.
A law passed by Tokugawa Ieyasu stated that only warriors could carry the
long sword. Thus, government officials began confiscating swords from
members of other social classes.

Kenchi -- A land survey conducted by Tokugawa Ieyasu that was used to create
official social class distinctions.

Kokoku Zen -- "Imperial Way Zen." A term used to describe Zen nationalism
during the Meiji period.
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Nichiren -- Founder of the Nichiren Shu school of Buddhism. Nichiren became
convinced of the pre-eminence of the Lotus Sutra, and he proclaimed that
devotion to the Lotus Sutra was the only correct form of Buddhist practice.

Nihonshoki -- One of the oldest books of recorded Japanese history. Written in
classical Chinese, it contains mythological tales and stories about early
Japanese Emperors.

Onin war -- A conflict between two powerful daimyo families, the Hosokawa and
the Yamana. This conflict marks the beginning of the "warring states period."

Pure Land -- Pure Land Buddhism teaches that devotion to Amida Buddha will
result in rebirth in the Pure Land, a realm where suffering is eradicated and
enlightenment may be achieved with relative ease.

Rinzai -- Sect of Zen Buddhism imported from China during the Kamakura period.

Ritsy-ryo -- A system of legal or penal codes (ritsu) and administrative codes (ryo)
established during the Asuka period.
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Samurai -- "One who serves." A term commonly used to describe the warrior class
of Japanese history.

Sengoku jidai -- "Warring states period." A term used to describe the warfare of late
medieval Japan as the "three unifiers" engaged in a series of military
campaigns throughout the Japanese mainland.

Sengoku daimyo -- A term used to describe the prominent feudal lords of the
sengoku period.

Seventeen Articles -- Said to be authored by Prince Shotoku, the Seventeen Articles
were a series of decrees that set forth a courtly ethic and proper hierarchical
relations and behavior.

Shingon -- School of Buddhism established by the monk Kukai at the beginning of
the Heian period.

Shinto -- Native Japanese religious tradition that focuses on devotion to a variety of
deities (kami).

Shogun -- "General." Official rank of the head of the warrior government.

1 14
Shogunate -- A term used to identify a shogun's administration.

Soto -- A school of Zen Buddhism brought to Japan by Dogen Kigen.

Tendai -- School of Buddhism founded by the monk Saicho during the Heian period.

Taika reforms -- A series of reforms issued by the central government in 646 that
attempted to establish clear systems of government and nationa
administration.

Ze� -- School of Buddhism that began to emerge during the Kamakura period.
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